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THE LAWYER AS PUBLIC FIGURE FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT PURPOSES
Alex B. Long*
INTRODUCTION
“Reputation ought to be the perpetual subject of my thoughts, and aim
of my behavior.”
-- John Adams1
In New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan,2 the Supreme Court famously held
that before a public official may recover damages in a defamation action,
the public official must first prove actual malice on the part of the
defendant. Thus, to prevail, the public official must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant knew the defamatory statement was
false or acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the
statement.3 In later decisions, the Court explained that this same rule
applied, not just to public officials, but to public figures as well.4
Although the basic rule from New York Times v. Sullivan is well
established, it is widely acknowledged that the focus on whether an
individual qualifies as a public figure often yields unpredictable results.5
Consider the following hypothetical as an example of this problem:
John is a relatively successful lawyer. He has been in practice for
a few years, and in that time has tried several cases that generated
significant publicity in his community. He is also active in state
politics and community affairs. Not long ago, protestors were
*

Associate Dean of Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, University of Tennessee
College of Law. Thanks to Paula Schaefer for her comments on an earlier draft and to
Adam Duggan and Porter Durham for their research assistance.
1
DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 46 (2001).
2
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3
Id. at 280.
4
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
5
See Marc A. Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 1657 (1987) (stating that by making the standard of protection for speech dependent
on the status of the play, the Court has produced “anomalous and unpredictable results”);
see also Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D.Ga.1976), aff'd,
580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978). (“Defining public figure is much like trying to nail a jellyfish
to the wall.”).
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demonstrating against what they perceived to be abuse of power on
the part of the executive branch when a group of counter-protestors
confronted them. Violence erupted, which led to the deaths of five
of the original protestors. Several of the counter-protestors were
charged with murder. The trial judge appointed John as counsel for
the counter-protestors because no other local lawyers were willing
to take the case. As one might expect, the killings and the
impending trial resulted in widespread publicity and public
comment. John was attacked in the media for his representation of
the counter-protestors. John eventually sued the local newspaper
for defamation after it ran several stories containing false and
defamatory statements about John’s actions while representing the
counter-protestors. The newspaper moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that John was a public figure and had failed to
prove that the defendants had acted with actual malice as required
under the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times v. Sullivan.
John argues that he is not a public figure and is therefore not
required to establish actual malice.
How should the court rule on the issue? On the one hand, John has
achieved a certain amount of notoriety through his practice, seems to be a
leader within his community and is involved in public affairs, and has
agreed to represent clients in a high-profile case, knowing full well that his
representation would invite public comment. On the other hand, one could
argue that John is simply a lawyer doing his job and has not voluntarily
thrust himself into the public spotlight. Should he be treated as a public
figure for purposes of defamation analysis and thus have to meet the
difficult burden of proving that the defendant acted with actual malice?
“John” in this hypothetical is obviously John Adams, and the scenario is
based on Adams’ representation of the British soldiers facing charges after
the Boston Massacre. The tale of Adams’ involvement in the case is one
that members of the legal profession love to tell. Adams’ actions represent
the best of what the legal profession likes to believe about itself, and Adams
himself is sometimes held up as the example of an important ideal: the
lawyer as public citizen.6
The idea that lawyers occupy a special role in society is strong in the
6

See Hon. Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., Chief Justice’s Address to Members of the
Missouri Bar, September 13, 2001, 57 J. Mo. B. 222, 225 (2001) (referencing the Boston
Massacre case and referring to Adams as “the consummate lawyer as public citizen”);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PMBL. ¶ 1 (2014) (describing a lawyer as “a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice”).
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literature about the legal profession.7 Lawyers are often described as
leaders and public citizens who occupy special places of prominence within
the community.8 Even if all lawyers do not occupy such positions, a quick
glance at television, the movies, literature, and news stories about the legal
process quickly confirms the reality that stories about lawyers and the legal
profession still attract considerable attention from members of the public.
The public is increasingly accustomed to seeing lawyers assume celebrity or
quasi-celebrity status in the course of representing clients in high-profile
cases or by serving as legal commentators in such cases. Lawyers, by their
nature, are sometimes litigious in their personal capacity and have
frequently assumed the role of plaintiffs in numerous defamation cases
against media defendants,9 as well as occasionally against former clients,10
opposing counsel,11 and others.12
7

See Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323, 1323-24
(2009) (“Although this nation may not have the world's most developed sense of attorneys'
public responsibilities, it undoubtedly has the most extensive commentary on the
subject.”); Debra Lyn Bassett, Redefining the Public Profession, 36 Rutgers L.J. 721, 72122 (2005) (noting the repeated references in legal literature to the idea of the law as a
“pubic profession”); Rick Hubbard, Restoring Citizen Representation in Our Democratic
Republic, 40-SPG Vt. B.J. 20, 27 (2014) (referring to the “the special role of the lawyer as
a public servant”); Judge Marcia S. Krieger, A Twenty-First Ethos for the Legal
Profession: Why Bother?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 865, 867 (2009)) (“[L]awyers have a
special role in the state as guardians of the legal order.”); Paula Schaefer, A Primer on
Professionalism for Doctrinal Professors, 81 TENN. L. REV. 277, 292 (2014) (discussing
the concept of the ideal lawyer as being one who “embraces the special role that lawyers
play in the legal system and in society”).
8
See Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Brandt (In re Brandt), 766 N.W.2d 194, 196, 202
(Wis. 2009) (“Attorneys are officers of the court and should be leaders in their
communities and should set a good example for others.”); ANTHONY J. KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1, 14-16 (1993) (discussing the
idea of the “lawyer-statesman,” who is a leader in the community); Curtis M. Jensen, A
Final Report and Farewell, 27-AUG UTAH B.J. 8, 9 (July/Aug. 2014) (“As lawyers, we are
the leaders in our communities . . . “); Alan J. Lefebvre, Maybe Reparations are Owed?,
22-FEB NEV. LAWYER 4,4 (2014) (referring to lawyers’ “rightful place as community and
political leaders”); Patrick G. Goetzingerd & Robert L. Morris, Project Rural Practice: Its
People and Its Purpose, 59 S.D. L. REV. 444, 445 (2014) (“Rural attorneys were civic
leaders regarded by their communities as much more than just another lawyer.”); Susan
Sturm, Law School, Leadership, and Change, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 49 (2013) (noting
that many lawyers play leadership roles in their communities); Elizabeth Mary Kameen,
Rethinking Zeal: Is it Zealous Representation or Zealotry?, MD. B.J. (Mar./Apr. 2011)
(discussing the role of lawyers as public citizens); Kim M. Boyle, LSBA’s Role and
Response in this Challenging Environment, 57 LA. B.J. 80, 80 (2009) (explaining that a
lawyer’s concept of professionalism is outlined in the Preamble to the Rules of
Professional Conduct).
9
See, e.g., Cochran v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (C.D.Cal. 1998).
10
Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005).
11
Arneja v. Gildar, 541 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1988); Owen v. Carr, 478 N.E.2d 658,
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Given these realities, it seems fair to ask whether the law should treat
lawyers differently than other citizens when they bring defamation claims
based on damage to their reputations. Should lawyers be treated as public
figures for purposes of defamation claims and, therefore, be subjected to a
higher evidentiary standard under the Supreme Court’s decision in New
York Times v. Sullivan?
The question is not merely an academic one. As anyone who has
studied defamation law knows, the resolution of the issue of whether a
plaintiff qualifies as a public figure often can make or break the plaintiff’s
case. There are numerous decisions involving lawyers as plaintiffs in
defamation cases, yet the decisions are inconsistent in their approach to and
resolution of the question of whether the lawyers in question qualify as
public figures. While the law is clear that one does not become a public
figure simply by applying for admission to the bar,13 there are relatively few
clear standards beyond that.14
The question of whether lawyers should be treated as public figures also
raises broader questions about the nature of defamation law and the legal
profession. By examining the Supreme Court’s defamation jurisprudence
through the lens of cases involving lawyers as plaintiffs, one can see the
deficiencies and inconsistencies in the Court’s opinions more clearly. And
by examining the Court’s defamation cases through this lens, one can also
see more clearly some of the complexities the legal profession now faces
and the sometimes uncertain nature of its role.
This article explores the extent to which lawyers should be treated as
public figures for purposes of defamation claims. Along the way, it
attempts to raise broader issues concerning conceptions of the legal
profession and the Supreme Court’s confusing approach to determining
public figure status. Part I begins by reviewing the Supreme Court’s
defamation decisions and the evolution of the concept of a “public figure”
beginning with New York Times v. Sullivan. Part II examines how lower
courts have applied the Supreme Court’s holdings involving public figures
to defamation cases involving lawyers as plaintiffs. Part III uses
defamation cases involving lawyers to illustrate the shortcomings of the
660 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985).
12
See Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386, 388 (D.V.I. 1979) (involving lawsuit
against, inter alia, state trial court judge who had written a defamatory letter about lawyer
that was published in newspaper).
13
Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Ark. 1979); see also
Marchiando v. Brown, 649 P.2d 462, 467 (N.M. 1982) (“Generally, lawyers, in pursuing
their profession, are not public figures …”).
14
According to one author, “courts more often than not have held that attorneys are
public figures when they become defamation plaintiffs.” RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE LAW
OF DEFAMATION § 2:75 (2013).
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Court’s approach. Finally, Part IV concludes by offering some guidelines
for courts to use when considering lawyer defamation cases that would
advance the public’s strong interest in discussing the legal process while
remaining faithful to the principles that underlie the Supreme Court’s
defamation decisions.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE FIGURE DISTINCTION
The question of the extent to which lawyers are truly public figures may
take on special relevance in the context of defamation lawsuits. As a matter
of constitutional law, public officials and public figures must satisfy a more
demanding standard than private figures in order to establish a prima facie
case of defamation. Despite over 50 years of decisional law, however, it is
often difficult to predict how a court will resolve the question of whether a
defamation plaintiff qualifies as a public figure or a private figure.
Nowhere is the outcome of that question more difficult to predict than in the
case of lawyers.
A. Defamation Law’s Treatment of Public Figures
In New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan,15 the Supreme Court held that, as a
matter of constitutional law, a public official pursuing a defamation claim
must establish actual malice on the part of the defendant.16 A defendant
acts with “actual malice” in this context when the defendant knows the
defamatory communication is false or acts with reckless disregard as to the
statement’s truth or falsity.17 Eventually, the Supreme Court expanded its
holding to public figures as well as public officials.18
As a result of the demanding proof structure that public figures face,
defamation plaintiffs typically resist, when possible, defendants’ attempts to
classify them as public figures.19 As explained by the Court, actual malice
exists only where the defendant subjectively entertained serious doubts
about the veracity of the defamatory statement.20 In contrast, private-figure
defamation plaintiffs are not required as a constitutional matter to establish
actual malice on the part of a defendant. Instead, they ordinarily must only
establish negligence on the part of a defendant and, in some states, can
15

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 279-80.
17
Id. at 280.
18
Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
19
But see Cochran v. Tory, 2003 WL 22451378, *4 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 29, 2003)
(noting that attorney Johnnie Cochran “willingly conced[ed]” that he was a public figure
for purposes of this defamation action).
20
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)
16
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establish a prima facie case in the absence of any degree of fault on the part
of the defendant.21 Given the obvious proof problems a plaintiff faces in
satisfying the actual malice standard, many defamation cases are won or
lost on the question of whether a plaintiff qualifies as a public figure.
B. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.22 is most famous for its explication of the
concept of a public figure in defamation actions. In Gertz, the Supreme
Court explained the distinctions between public figures and private figures
that it saw as justifying different proof structures in defamation actions.
The decision also famously drew distinctions between different types of
public figures. Thus, an understanding of Gertz is essential for purposes of
understanding defamation law. But because Gertz also involved a lawyer as
the plaintiff, the decision is also essential for purposes of understanding
how lawyers should be classified for purposes of defamation actions.
The plaintiff in Gertz was Elmer Gertz, a lawyer who had been retained
by the family of a youth who had been shot and killed by a police officer to
represent the family in a civil action against the police officer.23 In addition
to the civil lawsuit, the shooting resulted in criminal charges against the
police officer.24 As part of his representation of the family, Gertz attended
the coroner’s inquest into the death of the youth.25 The defendant published
a monthly magazine, which ran an article alleging a conspiracy by
communists to frame the police officer. The article alleged among things
that Gertz was a Marxist who was one of the architects of the supposed
conspiracy.26
Gertz sued for libel. The main issue facing the Supreme Court was the
applicability of the New York Times actual malice standard to the case.27
This necessarily required a determination as to whether Gertz qualified as a
public figure. In considering the issue, the majority articulated two
justifications for why public figures face the heightened burden of
establishing actual malice. First is the self-help rationale. Public officials
and public figures “usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic
opportunity to counteract false statements then private individuals normally
21

SMOLLA, supra note 14, at § 3:30.
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
23
Id. at 325.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 326.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 332.
22
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enjoy.”28 Because private figures usually lack such access, they are more
vulnerable to injury and the state has a correspondingly greater interest in
protecting them.29 The second and “more important” justification involves
assumption of risk principles. By voluntarily “thrust[ing] themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved,” public figures assume a risk of
heightened attention and comment.30
The Court then outlined two categories of public figures. The first is the
all-purpose or general-purpose public figure. These are individuals who
have achieved “such pervasive fame or notoriety that [they] become[] a
public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.”31 In subsequent cases,
the Court would explain that this was a narrow category, reserved for a
small group of individuals who had essentially become household names.32
Turning to the facts of Gertz’s case, the Court noted that Gertz had “long
been active in community and professional affairs,” had “served as an
officer of local civic groups and of various professional organizations, and
[had] published several books and articles on legal subjects.”33 While
conceding that Gertz was “well known in some circles,” the Court did not
view Gertz as having attained “general fame or notoriety in the
community,” as evidenced by the fact that none of the prospective jurors in
the case had ever heard of Gertz.34 The Court expressed a hesitation to
classify an individual as an all-purpose or general-purpose public figure
based simply on the individual’s participation in community and
professional affairs.35 Instead, the Court thought it preferable to focus on
“the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation.”36
This more narrow focus effectively defines the second category of
public figures, those who voluntarily inject themselves or are drawn into a
particular public controversy and thereby become public figures for a
limited range of issues.37 In Gertz’s case, the Court concluded that Gertz
did not qualify as a public figure for purposes of the defamatory statements
concerning his involvement in the supposed framing of the police officer in
the underlying case. Gertz “played a minimal role at the coroner's inquest”
28

Id. at 344.
Id.
30
Id. at 345.
31
Id. at 351.
32
Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 165 (1979).
33
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
34
Id. at 351-52.
35
Id. at 352.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 351.
29

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2724880

8

Lawyer as Public Figure

[29-Jan-16

and his involvement was simply that of a lawyer representing a private
client,38 not that of a “de facto public official.”39 Nor did Gertz ever discuss
the criminal or civil litigation with the press.40 In short, Gertz “plainly did
not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the
public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.”41 As such, he was
not a limited-purpose public figure and was instead best viewed as a private
figure.
Gertz also left open the possibility of a third category of public figures:
the involuntary public figure. The Gertz majority’s conception of public
officials and public figures is grounded in the notion that such individuals
voluntarily enter the public fray. But the majority also recognized that
“[h]ypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own.”42 While cautioning that
“instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare,” the
Court did leave open the possibility that some individuals might become
public figures without voluntarily injecting themselves into the spotlight
and perhaps through sheer bad luck.43
Although there remains considerable disagreement on the issues of how
to define the concept of an involuntary public figure and the continuing
viability of that category,44 at least some courts have been willing to hold
that an involuntary public may be required to establish actual malice when
pursuing defamation claims.45 Relying on Gertz’s assumption of the risk
justification, most courts that have categorized an individual as an
involuntary public figure have done so on the grounds that the individual,
through his actions, assumed the risk of resulting publicity and became a
central figure in a public controversy.46 As explained by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, to qualify as an involuntary public figure, the plaintiff
must be a central figure in a public controversy and have “taken some
38

Id.
Id.
40
Id. at 352.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 345.
43
Id.; see Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 742-43 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (concluding that plaintiff had become a public figure through “sheer bad luck” of
becoming a prominent figure in a public controversy).
44
See Joseph H. King, Jr., Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise of New York
Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 KY. L.J. 649, 673-94 (2007)
(noting some “suggest that the involuntary public figure subcategory is becoming a dead
letter or is heading in that direction” and discussing the different approaches to defining the
category).
45
See, e.g., Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002).
46
Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 539 (4th Cir. 1999).
39
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action, or failed to act when action was required, in circumstances in which
a reasonable person would understand that publicity would likely inhere.”47
C. Time, Inc. v. Firestone and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc.
In the two other cases to address the issue of whether a plaintiff was a
public figure, the Supreme Court again took a narrow view of the public
figure concept.
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,48 the defendant published an inaccurate and
defamatory account of the plaintiff’s divorce proceedings. When the
plaintiff sued, the defendant argued that the plaintiff was a public figure and
that the New York Times actual malice standard should therefore apply.49
The plaintiff, the wife of “the scion of one of America's wealthier industrial
families,” had filed the divorce action.50 The defendant reasoned that since
the case became a “cause celebre,” the matter was a public controversy and
the plaintiff was, therefore, a limited-purpose public figure.51 The Court
resolved the issue on the grounds that the divorce action was not the type of
public controversy envisioned by Gertz, even though it may have been of
interest to the public.52 According to the Court, the fact that a controversy is
of interest to the public does not mean that there is a “public controversy.”53
While ostensibly limited to the issue of whether a public controversy
existed, this portion of the opinion also touches on issues relevant to the
limited-public figure analysis. As in Gertz, the Court noted that the plaintiff
had not publicized her position.54 In addition, the Court questioned the
voluntariness of her action in filing for divorce, noting that she “was
compelled to go to court by the State in order to obtain legal release from
the bonds of matrimony.”55
In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc.,56 the Court once again refused
to classify an individual as a public figure. The plaintiff in Wolston had
pleaded guilty to contempt of court charges after failing to appear before a
grand jury investigating espionage charges involving Soviet intelligence
agents in the U.S.57 These events resulted in a certain amount of media
47

Id. at 540.
424 U.S. 448 (1976).
49
Id. at 453.
50
Id. at 450.
51
Id. at 454.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
443 U.S. 157 (1979).
57
Id. at 162.
48
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coverage. Over 15 years later, the defendant published a book discussing
Soviet espionage activities and listed the plaintiff as a Soviet agent.58 The
plaintiff sued for defamation.
The main issue before the Supreme Court was the plaintiff’s public
figure status. The Court first rejected the idea that Wolston became a public
figure simply because his actions attracted media attention: “A private
individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by
becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public
attention.”59 Next, the Court rejected the idea that Wolston had “engaged
the attention of the public in an attempt to influence the resolution of the
issues involved.”60 Here, the Court pointed to two factors. First, Wolston
had not attained any special prominence in the resolution of public
questions.61 Second, Wolston’s “failure to respond to the grand jury's
subpoena was in no way calculated to draw attention to himself in order to
invite public comment or influence the public with respect to any issue.”62
The Court suggested it would have been a different matter if Wolston had
invited the contempt citation “in order to use the contempt citation as a
fulcrum to create public discussion about the methods being used in
connection with an investigation or prosecution.”63 As it was, nothing
about Wolston’s actions suggested that he was seeking to arouse public
sentiment in his favor on these issues.64 Finally, the Court rejected the
notion that Wolston should be classified as a public figure by virtue of
having engaged in criminal conduct.65 In so doing, the Court expressed a
reluctance to classify participants in litigation as public figures. While
acknowledging that some litigants might be public figures, the Court opined
that the majority of litigants do not enter the public forum of trial
voluntarily. Instead, they are drawn into the forum involuntarily, either in
an attempt to obtain the only redress allowed by law or by the State in order
to defend against charges.66
In a concurring opinion, Justices Blackmun and Marshall criticized the
majority for what they viewed as an overly-restrictive approach to the issue
of public-figure status.67 According to Blackmun and Marshall, the
majority placed excessive emphasis on the need for the plaintiff to attempt
58

Id. at 160.
Id. at 167.
60
Id. at 168.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 169.
66
Id. at 168-69.
67
Id. at 170 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
59

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2724880

29-Jan-16]

Lawyer as Public Figure

11

to influence public discussion. Thus, the majority had seemingly concluded
that an individual becomes a limited-purpose public figure “only if he
literally or figuratively ‘mounts a rostrum’ to advocate a particular view.”68
II. LAWYERS AS PUBLIC FIGURES/PRIVATE FIGURES
Gertz and its progeny establish the framework for lower courts charged
with determining the public-figure status of defamation plaintiffs. In the
case of lawyers as defamation plaintiffs at least, the framework has not
produced consistent results. As the following section describes, lower
courts have not only reached conflicting results in comparable cases on the
issue, they have also been unable to agree as to the relevance of certain
actions on the part of lawyers in making the determination.
A. Lawyers as General/All-Purpose Public Figures
Relatively few lawyers are likely to achieve the type of pervasive fame
and notoriety necessary to qualify as all-purpose public figures.69 Perhaps
Clarence Darrow in his day,70 or Johnnie Cochran71 from the more recent
past might have met this threshold on a national level. But few lawyers
ever become household names on a national level. One who did is famed
radical lawyer William Kunstler.
Kunstler is one of the best examples of a cause lawyer, a lawyer who
“choose[s] clients and cases in order to pursue their own ideological …
causes.”72 Kunstler became famous over the course of his career for his
representation of clients in some of the most high profile cases of the time,
including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Chicago Seven, and Jack Ruby.73
68

Id. at 169 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See generally Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771,777 (Wyo.1991) (opining that famed
lawyer Gerry Spence might only be a public figure for some purposes, despite his
concession that he was a public figure).
70
See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
71
See Gerald F. Uelmen, Who is the Lawyer of the Century?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
613, 626 (2000) (referring to Cochran in 2000 as “the most famous living lawyer in
America”). In a defamation case in which he was the plaintiff, Cochran conceded that he
was a public figure. Cochran v. Tory, 2003 WL 22451378, *4 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 29,
2003)
72
Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type … Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 657, 689 (2004); see also Judith A. McMorrow & Luke M. Scheuer, The
Moral Responsibility of the Corporate Lawyer, 60 CATH. U.L. REV. 275, 298-99 (2011)
(identifying Kunstler as a cause lawyer).
73
David Stout, William Kunstler, 76, Dies: Lawyer for Social Outcasts, N.Y. TIMES,
September 5, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/05/obituaries/william-kunstler-76dies-lawyer-for-social-outcasts.html
69
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Kunstler garnered significant publicity for his representation of the Chicago
Seven and his unorthodox trial demeanor.74 Kunstler’s fame was so
substantial that during a riot, the rioters supposedly shouted, “Give us
Kunstler! We want Kunstler!”75 At the time of his death, the London Times
referred to Kunstler as “the most celebrated and detested lawyer in
America.”76
In the early 1970s, Kunstler sued a state judge for making defamatory
statements concerning Kunstler in a letter that was published in a
newspaper.77 Not surprisingly, Kunstler was held to be a general or allpurpose public figure.78 In reaching its decision, the court referenced the
fact that Kunstler “defended many of the leaders in the revolt of the 1960's
and early 1970's seeking to get rid of the ‘establishment,’” that Kunstler
“was almost always on the unpopular side of controversial cases,” and that
“[h]is cases and trial tactics were widely publicized.”79 Indeed, Kunstler’s
own lawyer was forced to acknowledge during oral argument that Kunstler
was “a controversial figure on a national scale.”80
In some respects, Willam Kunstler and Elmer Gertz were quite similar.
Both devoted significant energy to representing unpopular individuals and
both achieved some acclaim in the process.81 But what distinguishes the
two lawyers most clearly is the notoriety they attained and how they
attained it. Whereas Kunstler was “one of the leading lawyers in the
country”82 and was controversial on a national scale, Gertz “had achieved
74

See DAVID LANGUM, WILLIAM KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED LAWYER IN AMERICA
84, 99 (1999) (discussing media coverage in Life magazine and the New York Times); see
also id. at 216, 218 (discussing story in Playboy).
75
Id. at 280.
76
Id. at 1 (quoting London Times).
77
Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386, 392 (D.V.I. 1979).
78
Id. at 399.
79
Id. at 399.
80
Id. at 400. One of the more interesting aspects of the Ratner decision is the almost
palpable disdain the judge clearly has for Kunstler and the sense of satisfaction he seems to
take in concluding that Kunstler is a public figure and therefore must satisfy the demanding
actual malice standard.
81
Arguably, Elmer Gertz met the definition of a cause lawyer. Throughout his career,
Gertz represented parties associated with causes of the American left. These included his
representation of the company that published Arthur Miller’s Tropic of Cancer , which had
allegedly been censored for being obscene, ELMER GERTZ, A HANDFUL OF CLIENTS 229
(1965); convicted murder Nathan Leopold (of Leopold and Loeb fame), whose murder trial
had been a cause celebre of the American left, id. at 229; and multiple clients in civil rights
actions. According to his autobiography, Gertz “became famous in his own right through
his celebrated work for [his clients] and his struggles over the decades for civil liberties and
personal rights.” ELMER GERTZ, TO LIFE: THE STORY OF A CHICAGO LAWYER back cover
(1974).
82
Ratner, 465 F. Supp. at 399.
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no general fame or notoriety within the community.”83 While Kunstler
denied that appearing in the public spotlight was his “whole raison
d’etre,”84 he actively sought the spotlight to the point that he became one of
the most famous and controversial lawyers of all time.85
While few lawyers attain the level of national notoriety enjoyed by
William Kunstler, some may become general public figures on a more local
level.86 For example, Myron Steere was a court-appointed lawyer in a
highly publicized murder trial in Kansas.87 After a local radio station ran a
defamatory story involving Steere’s representation in the murder case,
Steere sued. From the court’s description of him, Steere embodies the ideal
of a lawyer as a public citizen. While the murder case generated significant
publicity, Steere was already well known to the public prior to the trial. He
had practiced law in his local community for 32 years, had previously
served eight years as county attorney, had “served as special counsel for the
board of county commissioners in a controversial dispute over the
construction of a new courthouse,” and “was a prominent participant in
numerous social activities and served as an officer and representative for
many professional, fraternal and social activities.”88 To the court, Steere
had assumed a role of such special prominence within his community that
he qualified as an all-purpose public figure.89

83

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974). This point is actually
debatable. By his own admission, Gertz had “appeared very frequently” on television and
radio and stated at the time, “There has never been a period in my mature life when I
haven't made public appearances of some kind.” Brief of Respondent on Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Gertz v. Robert Welch, No.
72-617 (1973), 1973 WL 172732, *8. Gertz also attained at least some level of fame
through his representation of high-profile clients. See text accompanying supra note 81. In
Gertz’s brief, Gertz downplayed his involvement in public activities, stating “he had been
involved in no public activities for a considerable period of time prior to the publication of
the article in question.” Reply Brief of Petitioner on Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Gertz v. Robert Welch, No. 72-617 (1973), 1973
WL 172733, *2.
84
William Kunstler, 76, Dies; Lawyer for Social Outcasts. N.Y. Times, Sep. 5, 1995,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/05/obituaries/william-kunstler-76-dieslawyer-for-social-outcasts.html.
85
See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
86
See Biskupic v. Cicero, 756 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding
former district attorney who had become a public citizen was an all-purpose public figure
within the community); DeCarvlho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806, 813 (R.I. 1980) (concluding
lawyer was a pervasive public figure within the Portugese community in Rhode Island).
87
Steere v. Cupp, 602 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Kan. 1979).
88
Id.
89
Id.
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B. Lawyers as Limited-Purpose Public Figures
Because few lawyers become household names, courts are more likely
to classify lawyers as limited-purpose public figures than all-purpose public
figures. In some cases, courts have suggested that a lawyer might be a
limited-purpose public figure with respect to controversies related to the
lawyer’s professional activities, but not with respect to other controversies
involving the lawyer.90 In addition to the overall level of notoriety a lawyer
has attained, courts may take into account the fact that the lawyer represents
a high-profile client, the extent of the lawyer’s interaction with the media,
the lawyer’s status as a community leader, and other relevant considerations
in determining whether a lawyer qualifies as a public figure.
1. Attaining Public Figure Status Through the Representation of HighProfile Clients
Perhaps the most common type of case involving lawyers as defamation
plaintiffs involves the lawyer who represents a notorious client or a client in
a high-profile case. Here, Gertz obviously casts a long shadow. Indeed,
one could argue that Gertz actually fits this fact pattern. As the lead lawyer
for the victim’s family in a controversial civil suit designed to establish
fault on the part of the police, Elmer Gertz could easily have been deemed
to have thrust himself to the forefront of a public controversy in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved.91 Indeed, defense counsel in
Gertz argued that Gertz had “voluntarily entered the fray of public
discussion on a controversial issue when he undertook to be counsel for the
Nelsons at the coroner's inquest” in an attempt to guide public policy.92
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that Gertz “plainly did not thrust himself
into the vortex of this public issue.”93 Thus, Gertz potentially poses a bit of
problem for defamation defendants seeking to classify a lawyer who has
represented a client in a high-profile case as a public figure.
Relying upon Gertz, a number of courts have since adopted a general
rule that a lawyer’s representation of a notorious client or a client in a highprofile matter does not, by itself, render the lawyer a public figure. 94 This is
90

Durham v. Cannan Communications, Inc., 645 S.W. 2d 845, 851 (Tex.Civ.App.

1982),
91

See id. at 345 (defining limited-purpose public figures as those who “have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved”).
92
Brief of Respondent on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, Gertz v. Robert Welch, No. 72-617 (1973), 1973 WL 172732, *9.
93
Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
94
Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1085-86 (3d Cir.
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true even if the lawyer in question had achieved some measure of fame
prior to the representation.95 Thus, for example, mere representation of a
public entity does not transform a lawyer into a limited-purpose public
figure under the general approach.96 The rule applies to appointed counsel
as well as lawyers who voluntarily represent high-profile clients.97 Indeed,
in one case, the court actually likened the plaintiff-attorney to Elmer Gertz,
stating that the plaintiff was “a well-known attorney, although certainly not
a celebrity,” and that “the trial court’s sole basis for holding that he was a
public figure was the fact that he was appointed to handle a criminal
appeal.”98 This fact, however, was insufficient to confer limited-public
figure status.99
Aside from referencing Gertz, courts that have adopted the general rule
have often done so on the grounds of ensuring access to justice. As
explained by the Wyoming Supreme Court, “To hold otherwise would have
a chilling effect upon attorneys who undertake to represent clients in
difficult, unpopular, high profile, or sensational types of cases.”100 This, in
turn, might make it more difficult for such clients to obtain skilled
counsel.101
1985); Steere v. Cupp, 602 P.2d 1267, 1274 (Kan. 1979); Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771,
777 (Wyo. 1991); see also ZYZY Corp. v. Hernandez, 345 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex.App.San Antonio 2011) (quoting Spence in support of rule); O’Neil v. Peekskill Faculty Ass’n,
120 A.D.2d 36, 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“Mere representation of a public entity such as
a school district, without more, does not render an attorney a limited purpose public
figure.”); Kurth v. Great Falls Tribune Co., 804 P.2d 393, 395 (Mont. 1991) (citing Gertz
in support of the rule); Doe No. 1. v. Burke, 91 A.3d 1031, 1043 (D.C. Ct. App. 2014);
Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)
(concluding that being appointed counsel in a criminal case “is an insufficient basis for
holding plaintiff to be a ‘public figure’”); see also SMOLLA, supra note 14, at § 2:75
(2013) (“If an attorney does no more than represent a client in a strictly legal context, he or
she will not through that representation alone become a public figure …”).
95
See Spence, 816 P.2d at 776 (“A professional person, who may be a “public figure”
for some purposes, should be free to offer his services to a client as a private professional
without being subjected to public figure defamation.”). Do you think this is right? I hope
you’re going to say more about this case.
96
O’Neil v. Peekskill Faculty Ass’n, 120 A.D.2d 36, 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
97
Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Spence, 816 P.2d at 776-77; see also Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1085-86 (explaining
that a contrary rule “would place an undue burden on attorneys who represent famous or
notorious clients”).
101
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 355 (1974) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (“The important public policy which underlies [the tradition of performing a
professional representative role as an advocate ]—the right to counsel—would be gravely
jeopardized if every lawyer who takes an ‘unpopular’ case, civil or criminal, would
automatically become fair game for irresponsible reporters and editors who might, for
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Despite this commonly-stated rule, there are perhaps an equal number of
decisions finding individual lawyers to be limited purpose public figures
based, solely or at least in substantial part, on their representation of a
notorious client or a client in a high-profile matter.102 For example,
Schwartz v. Worrall Publications, Inc.,103 a case from New Jersey, involved
an attorney, Schwartz, who had previously served as the attorney for a local
school district and president of the New Jersey School Boards Association.
He then served as attorney for the Association as part of a government
inquiry into the Association’s finances.104 During the representation, a local
newspaper falsely reported that Schwartz was himself the focus of the
investigation.105 A New Jersey appellate court concluded that the lawyer
was a public figure for purposes of his defamation claim against the
paper.106 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted Schwartz’s long
involvement with the state education system and stated that as the attorney
for the Association, “Schwartz voluntarily assumed a particularly visible
position in the forefront of a very public issue. In that position, he invited
and received comment and attention.”107
Schwartz is not an outlier. In one case, the only reason given for the
conclusion that a lawyer was a limited-purpose public figure was that the
lawyer represented a county board of supervisors.108 In another, a lawyer
who volunteered to represent a group of white supremacists was found to be
a public figure because, by virtue of his representation, he had voluntarily
example, describe the lawyer as a ‘mob mouthpiece’ for representing a client with a serious
prior criminal record, or as an ‘ambulance chaser’ for representing a claimant in a personal
injury action.”); Spence, 816 P.2d at 777 (“We can foresee also detriment to these potential
clients being unable to employ skilled, capable, specialist lawyers who have achieved some
fame and reputation because of their legal and trial abilities and are claimed to have
achieved public figure status.”).
102
See cases discussed at infra notes 103-109 and accompanying text; see also Ratner
v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386, 400 (D.V.I. 1979) (relying heavily on the fact that plaintiff
volunteered to represent criminal defendant for free in concluding that she was a limitedpurpose public figure); Bandelin v. Pietsch, 563 P.2d 395, 398 (Idaho 1977) (basing public
figure decision on the grounds that the lawyer “was a pivotal figure in the controversy
regarding the accounting of the estate” of which lawyer was guardian); Weingarten v.
Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 142 (1980) (basing decision that lawyer was a public figure
in large part on the fact that lawyer continued to represent clients in high-profile matters).
103
610 A.2d 425 (N.J. 1992).
104
Id. at 426.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 428.
107
Id. at 429; see also Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 137 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980) (finding lawyer was a public figure, in part, on the basis that he represented a
governmental agency that had received significant public attention).
108
Griffin v. Delta Democrat Times Pub. Co., 815 So.2d 1246, 1248 (Miss. Ct. App.
2002).
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injected himself into public controversies concerning the group.109 In
another, the court concluded that a lawyer qualified as a limited-purpose
public figure when he “voluntarily injected himself into the matter of public
controversy” when he “initiated a series of purposeful, considered actions,
igniting a public controversy in which he continued to play a prominent
role.”110 However, the only “purposeful, considered actions” identified in
the decision were the attorney’s acts of serving as a trustee for a client and
negotiating and litigating on behalf of that client against an adverse party in
a case that attracted significant local media attention.111 In other words, the
sole basis for the court’s conclusion appears to have been the fact that the
lawyer did his job on behalf of a notorious client. The fact that the lawyer
“was motivated by fiduciary obligations or ethical responsibilities” was
“irrelevant” to the question of whether he was a public figure.112
Although courts have generally refrained from classifying a lawyer who
represents a notorious client as an involuntary public figure, in at least one
case, this seems like the most apt description of the lawyer in question.
Bandelin v. Pietsch,113 an Idaho case, involved a lawyer who had been
appointed by a court to serve as guardian for an incompetent individual and
her estate. Thus, as a court-appointed attorney, the lawyer did not even
voluntarily assume a prominent role in the matter in the same way that a
lawyer who seeks out or willingly agrees to represent a notorious client. As
a result of his alleged mishandling of the case, the judge ordered the lawyer
to be held in contempt.114 The local newspaper ran multiple stories about
the matter, two of which contained defamatory statements about the
lawyer.115 In classifying the lawyer as a limited-purpose public figure, the
Idaho Supreme Court made note of the fact that the lawyer had previously
achieved notoriety within the county based on his civic and professional
activities. However, the court was explicit that this was not the exclusive
reason for its conclusion that the lawyer was a public figure and instead
chose to make the determination by examining the nature of the lawyer’s
involvement in the matter that led to the defamatory publications.116 The
court relied upon Gertz’s observation that that the limited-purpose public
figure determination should focus on “the nature and extent of an
individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the
109

Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 61 P.3d 606, 609 (Idaho 2002).
Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489 So. 2d 72, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
563 P.2d 395 (Idaho 1977).
114
Id. at 396.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 398.
110
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defamation.”117 According to the court, as the court-appointed guardian of
the estate, the lawyer “was the center of the controversy that gave rise to the
[defamatory] publications” and played “a pivotal figure in the controversy
regarding the accounting of the estate that gave rise to the defamation.”118
As such, the court concluded he was a public figure who had to establish
actual malice on the part of the newspaper. In the court’s view, the fact that
the lawyer did not seek the limelight was not determinative insofar as the
actual malice standard “is based upon a value judgment that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited. That judgment is applicable to both the
individual who becomes embroiled in a public controversy through no
effort of his own and the individual who actively generates controversyboth abdicate their anonymity.”119
In some respects, these decisions are in tension with Gertz. The Gertz
Court was unwilling to conclude that voluntary representation in a highprofile matter justifies conferring public-figure status upon a lawyer. Yet,
decisions like Schwartz seem to be premised in large part on such action.
Bandelin takes a step further in this regard and concludes that public-figure
status may result from court-appointed representation in a case that results
in public attention. At the same time, the decisions are consistent with the
notion that one becomes a limited-purpose public figure when one
voluntarily thrusts himself to the center of a public controversy in order to
influence the resolution of that controversy. That is, after all, what a
litigator gets paid to do. Assuming that there is some way that these
conflicting decisions can be reconciled, there remains a broader normative
question: should a lawyer who represents a client in a high-profile case and
who is then subsequently be defamed be treated as a public figure for
purposes of a resulting defamation claim?
2. Attaining Public Figure Status Through Participation in Community
Affairs
Another potentially relevant consideration in the public figure analysis
is the extent of a lawyer’s participation in community affairs. In Gertz,
Elmer Gertz had “long been active in community and professional affairs”
and had “served as an officer of local civic groups.”120 Yet, this was
insufficient to confer public-figure status upon Gertz. Other courts have
followed Gertz’s lead in this respect. For example, in Bandelin, the courtappointed lawyer had been actively involved in the political and social
117

Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
Id.
119
Id.
120
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
118
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affairs of his community. But, referencing Gertz, the Idaho Supreme Court
declined to base its decision as to the lawyer’s public figure status
exclusively on this fact.121 In other cases, however, the fact that a lawyer
has attained notoriety by being a civic leader or actively involved in politics
has played a strong role in the courts’ analysis.122
In many of the decisions to hold that the plaintiffs were public figures,
the lawyers in question had previously held public office or been political
candidates.123 This is generally consistent with the courts’ treatment of
similarly-situated individuals who were formerly public officials but retired
to private life.124 Not all decisions fit this description, however. In one
case, the plaintiff-lawyer was a Town Alderman.125 However, rather than
finding him to be a public official, the court found the lawyer to be a public
figure based on his other community activities. Specifically, the lawyer was
“a leader of the movement for the preservation of the Cajun culture and
heritage in Louisiana, and he has acted as a spokesman for that cause on
121

Bandelin, 563 P.3d at 398.
Tate v. Bradley, 679 F. Supp. 608, 612 (W.D. La. 1987) (finding lawyer had
assumed public, leadership role in promoting Cajun culture), aff’d on other grounds, 837
F.2d 206, 207 (5th Cir. 1988); Pace v. Rebore, 107 A.D.2d 30, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
(noting lawyer was chairman of local Republican Committee); Crowe Deegan LLP v.
Schmitt, 2006 WL 1320617, *6 (April 12, 2006 N.Y. Sup. Ct.). But see Marchiando v.
Brown, 649 P.2d 462, 467 (N.M. 1982) (concluding that although plaintiff was “well
known as an attorney and well known as a member of the Democratic Party, this is not
sufficient to depict him as a public figure”); Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., Inc. 423
S.E.2d 560, 582 (W. Va. 1992) (holding lawyer who was a member of Board of Governors
of state bar was not a public figure or a public official).
123
Cohn v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 67 A.D.2d 140, 145 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979) (concluding that lawyer who had served as chief counsel to the Investigations
Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee, chaired by Senator
McCarthy, was a public figure); Biskupic v. Cicero, 756 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Wis. Ct. App.
2008) (concluding that lawyer who had been a public official remained an all-purpose
public figure after leaving office); DeCarvlho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806, 813 (R.I. 1980)
(concluding that lawyer who had appointed as Portugese Consul in Rhode Island for the
country of Portugal and was a “giant” in the Portugese legal community was a pervasive
public figure within the Portugese community); Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568
S.E.2d 893, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that lawyer who had been the
Republican nominee for Attorney General was a public figure); Crowe Deegan LLP v.
Schmitt, 2006 WL 1320617, *6 (April 12, 2006 N.Y. Sup. Ct.); Schulman v. E. W. Scripps
Co., No. 35539, 1977 WL 201196, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 1977) (holding lawyer
was a public figure locally, inter alia, because he had been a political candidate and had
been involved in prior lawsuits against government officials).
124
Joseph H. King, Whither the “Paths of Glory”: The Scope of the New York Times
Rule in Defamation Claims by Former Public Officials and Candidates, 38 VT. L. REV.
275, 302-03 (2013) (stating that some courts classify former public officials who are
defamed after leaving office as public figures based on their past offices).
125
Tate v. Bradley, 679 F. Supp. 608, 612 (W.D. La. 1987),
122
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various occasions.”126 Therefore, he was a public figure for the limited
purpose of a defamatory newspaper article involving him and Cajun
culture.127
3. Attaining Public Figure Status Through Media Interactions
While Gertz expressed reluctance about classifying a lawyer as a public
figure based solely on the lawyer’s performance of his or her duties as a
lawyer, the decision also suggests that a lawyer’s interactions with the
media might lead to public figure status. In concluding that Gertz was not a
limited-purpose public figure, the Court noted the fact that Gertz “never
discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press and was never
quoted as having done so.”128 The implication then is that a lawyer’s
interaction with the media may be a relevant factor in determining whether
the lawyer thrust himself to the forefront of the public controversy
surrounding his client’s case in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved.
Since Gertz, the courts have been less than clear as to how much media
contact is enough to push a lawyer into the world of public figure status for
purposes of defamatory statements concerning the lawyer’s involvement in
a client matter. For example, in a federal decision from Hawaii, the court
concluded that a court-appointed lawyer in a high-profile murder case was a
limited-purpose public figure based on the fact that he had “actively sought
exposure to the media and voluntarily maintained a high profile throughout
the trial.”129 Notably, the court drew a line between media contact that is
“necessary for the vigorous defense of [a] client,” and media contact that is
not and found the lawyer on the wrong side of that line.130 This, of course,
begs an important question: when is contact with the media “necessary for
the vigorous defense of a client?” Unfortunately, the court is less than
precise in answering the question. The court provided no concrete
examples. Instead, all the court tells us is that the lawyer “actively sought
exposure to the media and voluntarily maintained a high profile throughout
the trial” and that he “voluntarily engaged in a course of action with respect
to the trial that was bound to invite attention and comment.”131
Unfortunately, no clear standard emerges from the decisions as to when
126

Id. at 609.
Id. at 612.
128
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
129
Partington v. Bugliosi, 825 F. Supp. 906, 917 (D. Haw. 1993) aff'd. 56 F.3d 1147
(9th Cir. 1995).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 917-18.
127
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a lawyer’s contact with the media transforms the lawyer into a public figure.
Consenting to television and newspaper interviews during the course of
representation has been held sufficient to render a lawyer a limited-purpose
public figure in some instances,132 but not others.133 In other cases, issuing
press releases134 or making “a few public comments about the
representation and future actions planned”135 was insufficient to render the
lawyers in question public figures. To the extent it is possible to discern
any kind of meaningful standard from the decisions, a lawyer is likely to be
classified as a public figure when the lawyer utilizes the media for, in the
words of one court, “personal aggrandizement.”136
4. Attaining Public Figure Status Through Courtroom Behavior or
Misconduct
There are a handful of decisions in which lawyers attained public figure
status primarily by engaging in behavior in court that essentially invites
media attention.137 For example, in a Michigan case, a court-appointed
lawyer in a criminal case had “excoriated the court repeatedly, and barraged
the prosecutor and many witnesses with a steady stream of vitriol and
invective.”138 He accused the judge and the prosecutor of collusion, called
the prosecutor to the stand as a defense witness, “threatened to investigate
all participants in the trial and subpoena their criminal records in response
to what he deemed traducement by the court of his investigator,” and
threatened to put the judge on the stand and examine him about his “prior
record.”139 Eventually, the judge in the case questioned the lawyer’s sanity

132

Hayes v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 858 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); see also
Martin v. Widener University School of Law, No. 91C-03-255, 1992 WL 153540, at *10
(Del. June 17, 1992) (concluding that applicant for the bar was a limited-purpose public
figure through his actions of filing a lawsuit and granting an interview to reporters about
the case).
133
Steere v. Cupp, 602 P.2d 1267 (Kan. 1979).
134
Gilbert v. WNIR 100 FM, 756 N.E.2d 1263, 1271-72 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
135
ZYZY Corp. v. Hernandez, 345 S.W.3d 452 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011). But
see Doe No. 1 v. Burke, 91 A.3d 1031, 1043 (D.C. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding attorney
“sought substantial publicity for this case by putting out press releases and giving
interviews and was therefore a public figure).
136
Gilbert v. WNIR 100 FM, 756 N.E.2d 1263, 1273 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
137
Hayes v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 858, 865-66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980);
Fisher v. Detroit Free Press, 404 N.W.2d 765, 768 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); see also
Bandelin v. Pietsch, 563 P.2d 395, 397 (Idaho 1977) (noting that press coverage began
when press “became aware of the trial judge's criticism of” lawyer).
138
Hayes, 295 N.W.2d at 862.
139
Id. at 862-63.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2724880

22

Lawyer as Public Figure

[29-Jan-16

and appointed a psychiatrist to observe the lawyer.140 The local paper ran an
editorial criticizing the lawyer’s behavior, which prompted the lawyer to
sue for defamation.141 Relying upon Gertz’s assumption of risk rationale
for classifying an individual as a limited-purpose public figure, the court
concluded that the lawyer, “by the manner in which he conducted himself in
a public judicial proceeding, invited attention and comment.”142
In contrast, other courts insist that a lawyer must have thrust herself into
a public controversy in an effort to influence its resolution before public
figure status is appropriate; mere misconduct is insufficient. In Littlefield v.
Ford Dodge Messenger, the attorney engaged in the practice of law while
his license was suspended.143 A newspaper reported on the matter but
misstated some of the facts of the case.144 According to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the lawyer may have engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law, but “there is no indication that he did so out of a desire to
influence any public controversy.”145 As such, he could not be a public
figure.146
5. Totality of the Circumstances
In many cases – indeed, perhaps in most – courts do not base their
decisions as to an individual’s public-figure status solely on any one factor.
Even in cases in which a lawyer’s representation of a high-profile client,
media interactions, or some other factor influenced a court’s decision, there
are often other factors that helped lead a court to the conclusion that a
lawyer was a public figure.147 Thus, many cases involve a totality of the
circumstance analysis.
For example, in Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men,148 the
plaintiff-lawyer was defamed by an article stating that the lawyer was guilty
of illegal drug activity when, in fact, he had only been charged with the
crime and those charges had been dropped.149 Thus, one basis for
concluding that the lawyer was a public figure was the fact that he had been

140

Id. at 862.
Id. at 860.
142
Id. at 865-66.
143
614 F.2d 581, 582 (8th Cir. 1980).
144
Id.
145
Id. at 584.
146
Id.
147
See, e.g., Hayes v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 858, 866 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980) (basing conclusion on lawyer’s courtroom behavior and media interaction).
148
54 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.)
149
Id. at 1077.
141
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charged with a crime.150 Another was the fact that the lawyer frequently
represented members of notorious motorcycle gangs who had been accused
of illegal drug activities.151 A third was the fact that the lawyer associated
with the members of one of those gangs outside of his professional
duties.152 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals restated the general rule that
legal representation of a client, by itself, does not establish an individual as
a public figure.153 Moreover, “if each element of the equation is taken
separately it may be argued that no one aspect may be sufficient to create
public figure status.”154 However, by considering all of the factors “in
context and as a whole,” the court concluded that the lawyer had “crossed
the line from private to limited purpose public figure.”155 Thus, the
categories identified may combine in any number of ways --with each other
or with other factors – to help lead to the determination that an individual
qualifies as a public figure.
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DEFAMATION
JURISPRUDENCE AS ILLUSTRATED BY CASES INVOLVING LAWYERS AS
PLAINTIFFS
To some extent, the uncertainty surrounding the classification of
lawyers as public figures is representative of the broader uncertainty
surrounding the test for determining the classification of individuals as
public figures more generally. The considerations identified in Gertz and
its progeny have failed to produce consistent results on the issue of whether
an individual qualifies as a public figure. Part of the uncertainty has to do
with the fact that the Court has simply never articulated a clear test for
determining public figure status.156 The result is that courts often apply
Gertz in unpredictable ways, sometimes leading to disparate results.157
This article is certainly not the first piece of legal scholarship to point
out the shortcomings of the Supreme Court’s defamation jurisprudence.158
150

Id. at 1085.
Id.
152
Id. at 1086.
153
Id. at 1085.
154
Id. at 1086.
155
Id.
156
Nat Stern, Unresolved Antitheses of the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 HOU. L.
REV. 1027, 1042 (1996).
157
See Marcone v. Penthouse Intern. Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1082 (3d Cir.
1985) (“Without a precise diagram for guidance, courts and commentators have had
considerable difficulty in determining the proper scope of the public figure doctrine.”).
158
See King, supra note 44, at 661 (“From the start, New York Times sequelae have
151
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But in order to fully appreciate why the lawyer-as-defamation-plaintiff
cases have proven to be so difficult for courts, some further examination of
the shortcomings of the Gertz line of cases is in order. Courts have
interpreted Gertz in different ways, with some placing greater emphasis on
particular facets of the decision than others.159 In any case involving the
question of whether an individual is a limited-purpose public figure, courts
must consider two major issues: (1) whether a public controversy or public
issue existed prior to the defamatory publication and (2) the nature and
extent of the plaintiff’s participation in the controversy or issue. Gertz and
its progeny have provided lower courts with sometimes confusing guidance
on these issues.
A. The Unclear Notion of “Public Controversies”
One shortcoming of the Court’s New York Times line of cases is the
unclear meaning of the concepts of public issues and public controversies.
Gertz explains that before one can be a limited-purpose public figure, there
must first be a public controversy into which the plaintiff entered.160 But
the Supreme Court has not clearly defined this phrase.161 The result is
uncertainty about how this threshold question will be resolved in any given
case.
1. Public Controversies and Matters of Public Concern
a. Public Controversies
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court first spoke of the need to
establish actual malice in the context of discussion of “public issues.”162
But in subsequent cases, the Court made clear that one did not become a
public figure simply by being associated with a “public” or “newsworthy”

come in tentative and uncertain steps, and increasingly appear as chaotic groping for
direction beset by increasing legal complexity.”); Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Libel, Language,
and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. REV. 273, 276 (1990)
(referring to the Court’s decisions as involving a “fragmented, confusing and unsatisfying
array of criteria and requirements”).
159
Stern, supra note 156, at 1040-42; see SMOLLA, supra note 14, at § 2:22 (2013)
(stating “the methodology employed by lower courts in defining the public figure concept
has varied considerably”).
160
Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enterprises, Inc., 818 F.2d 431, 433 (5 th Cir. 1987).
161
See Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6 th Cir. 1981) (“The
Supreme Court has not clearly defined the elements of a ‘public controversy.’”).
162
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71(1964).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2724880

29-Jan-16]

Lawyer as Public Figure

25

issue.163 Instead, beginning with Gertz and continuing through Wolston, the
Court gradually moved from the term to “public issue” to the phrase “public
controversy” to describe the relevant concept; one becomes a limitedpurpose public figure by thrusting oneself into the vortex of a public
controversy.164
Unfortunately, the Court failed to define the term in any meaningful
way.165 The Wolston decision suggests that the Court originally viewed the
term in an extremely narrow fashion. In Wolston, the Court questioned
whether the plaintiff had allegedly thrust himself into any existing public
controversy when he failed to respond to a subpoena for a hearing
investigating Soviet espionage. In a footnote, the Court noted “there was no
public controversy or debate in 1958 about the desirability of permitting
Soviet espionage in the United States; all responsible United States citizens
understandably were and are opposed to it.”166 Because the Court decided
the case on other grounds, it never definitively decided what the public
controversy in the case entailed.167 But this passage suggests a highly literal
and restrictive view of the word “controversy”; a controversy exists only
where there is an actual, ongoing debate among substantial portions of the
public concerning a specific issue. This footnote also hints at the Court’s
desire to limit the scope of the public controversy concept. Surely, given
the recent McCarthy hearings and the rise of the Cold War, there was
“public controversy or debate” over the extent and potential consequences
of Soviet espionage in 1958. Instead, the Court somewhat comically
limited the consideration to one of whether there was public controversy or
debate concerning the desirability of Soviet espionage and – not
surprisingly – discerned little public controversy over the issue.
As a result of the Court’s less than clear guidance, lower courts have
struggled in applying this portion of the Court’s jurisprudence. Some lower
courts have taken a similarly restrictive approach, focusing on the existence
of an actual, live public dispute over a specific issue.168 For example, the
163

See supra notes 53 & 59 and accompanying text.
Gertz used the terms seemingly interchangeably. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 345, (1974) (“public controversy”) with id. at 352 (“public issue). Time
Inc. v. Firestone used the term “public controversy” almost exclusively. 424 U.S. 448,
452-54 (1976).
Wolston eventually used the term “public controversy” exclusively.
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 164-66 (1979).
165
See Marcone v. Penthouse Intern. Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1082 (3d Cir.
1985) (“The Supreme Court has not provided a detailed chart of the contours of the public
and private figure categories.”).
166
Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166 n. 8.
167
Id.
168
See Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 647 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating to qualify as a
controversy, there “must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public
or some segment of it”); Warford v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 789 S.W.2d 758, 769
164
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Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the “‘nationwide controversy
regarding recruitment of college athletes’ is too general a statement of a
public controversy.”169 Other courts tend to take a more general approach,
focusing more on the existence of differing views on a general subject.170
Courts have also struggled over the meaning of the word “public” in this
context. There are several ways one could view the idea of a “public”
controversy. A controversy could be “public” because large segments of
the public actually disagree about the issue.171 Alternatively, a controversy
could be “public” insofar as it actually affects the public at large. 172 As a
result of the Court’s lack of clarity, courts frequently differ in their
articulation of the meaning of a “public controversy.”173

(Ky. 1990) (requiring instead the existence of a “particular and identifiable” controversy).
169
Warford, 789 S.W.2d at 767 (Ky. 1990).
170
See Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6 th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that infamous rape trials qualified as a public controversy because they “were
the focus of major public debate over the ability of our courts to render even-handed
justice”); Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 123, 138 (2d Cir.1984) (“A
public “controversy” is any topic upon which sizeable segments of society have different,
strongly held views.”).
171
See Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6 th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that infamous rape trials qualified as a public controversy because they “were
the focus of major public debate over the ability of our courts to render even-handed
justice”); Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 123, 138 (2d Cir.1984) (“A
public “controversy” is any topic upon which sizeable segments of society have different,
strongly held views.”).
172
Marcone v. Penthouse Intern. Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir.
1985) (“To be “public,” the dispute must affect more than its immediate participants.”);
Klentzman v. Brady, 312 S.W.3d 886, 905 (Tex.App.–Houston [1 Dist.] 2009) (explaining
that to qualify, people must be discussing “’a real question,’” “’the resolution of which was
likely to impact persons other than those involved in the controversy’”).
173
Perhaps the most common test has two parts. First, there must be a dispute, the
resolution of which would impact the public or segments of the public. Courts adopting
this approach sometimes emphasize that the foreseeable impact on others must be
“substantial.” Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir.
1980). In addition, under this approach, the dispute must result in significant public
attention. See id. at 1296 (“[A] public controversy is a dispute that in fact has received
public attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct
participants.”); Lluberes v. Uncommon Productions, LLC, 663 F.3d 6, 13 (1 st Cir. 2011)
(stating that to qualify, it must be shown that a controversy is “more than a ‘cause célèbre,’
or ‘a matter that attracts public attention,” and instead “persons actually were discussing
some specific question ... [and] a reasonable person would have expected persons beyond
the immediate participants in the dispute to feel the impact of its resolution”) (citations
omitted); Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enterprises, Inc., 818 F.2d 431, 433 (5 th Cir. 1987)
(“The controversy at issue must be public both in the sense that people are discussing it and
people other than the immediate participants in the controversy are likely to feel the impact
of its resolution.”).
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Matters of Public Concern

Complicating matters somewhat was the Court’s introduction of the
concept of a “matter of public concern” into the defamation framework. In
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,174 the last case in
which the Court has spoken at length on the public figure concept in
defamation law, did not analyze whether the speech in question concerned a
public controversy. Instead, the Court chose to use the term “matter of
public concern” in explaining why a private-figure plaintiff who was
defamed concerning a private matter did not, as a constitutional matter,
have to establish even negligence, let alone actual malice, to prevail.175 In
deciding the matter, the Court drew upon a long line of public employee
free speech cases.
In its public employee free speech decisions, the Court has consistently
spoken in terms of speech on matters of public concern. To be entitled to
First Amendment protection, a public employee must have spoken “as a
citizen on a matter of public concern.”176 According to the Court, “Speech
involves matters of public concern ‘when it can be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a
subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.’”177 By
the Court’s own admission, it has proven difficult to define precisely the
concept of a matter of public concern.178 But, the Court’s decisions make
clear that there need not be a public controversy before the matter is one of
public concern. Instead, the focus is more on the importance or
newsworthiness of the matter. This is significant insofar as years earlier,
the Court had rejected the notion that the fact that a defendant’s speech
involved newsworthy issues was sufficient to justify the use of the actual
malice standard.179
The fact that the Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc. chose to incorporate its public employee speech jurisprudence
and omit any reference to public controversies could be read as an attempt
to settle on the public concern concept and to abandon the requirement of a
public controversy.180 Indeed, in its subsequent defamation cases, the Court
174

472 U.S. 749 (1985).
Id. at 755-62.
176
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
177
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
443, 453 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted).
178
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
179
See supra notes 53 & 59 and accompanying text.
180
See Don Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., Philadelphia
175
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eschewed any mention of the public controversy concept and instead spoke
of matters of public concern.181 Some lower courts seem to have read these
decisions in this manner and have focused on the question of whether the
defamatory speech involved a matter of public concern.182 Indeed, as
recently as 2012, the Supreme Court has discussed the actual malice
standard in terms of defamatory statements involving “matters of public
concern.”183
Some have argued that the Court’s defamation decisions should be read
to suggest that the terms “public controversy” and “matter of public
concern” are intended to be kept separate and are terms of art.184 But to the
extent a distinction exists between public controversies and matters of
public concern, the distinction has sometimes been lost in practice as lower
courts sometimes use the terms interchangeably.185 In fact, some courts
have used the term “public controversy,” but appear to define it in terms of
newsworthiness, such as the case in which a federal court stated the “public
controversy” involved a contract dispute between a professional baseball
player and his team.186 Others continue to utilize the public controversy
nomenclature.187
The fact that there is still uncertainty regarding a fundamental concept
in the actual malice standard over 50 years after the Supreme Court first
articulated that standard is fairly remarkable. If the public controversy and
matter of public concern concepts are truly distinct concepts that serve
independent functions, the Court has adopted an astonishingly convoluted
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, and Speech on Matters of Public Concern: New Directions in
First Amendment Defamation Law, 20 IND. L. REV. 767, 768 (1987) (stating that with this
decision and others, the Court “returned to first amendment defamation law a consideration
seemingly discarded in Gertz: whether the speech at issue is ‘of public concern”).
181
See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986);
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
182
See TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007)
(omitting any reference to public controversies and instead focusing on the existence of a
matter of public concern in the sense of whether a matter is of general interest); Ferguson
v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1984) (stating there must be a matter of public interest
and emphasizing that the matter need not result in actual controversy).
183
U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2563 (2012).
184
SMOLLA, supra note 14, at § 3:20 (“It is extremely important to keep the "matters of
public concern" standard articulated in Dun & Bradstreet separate from the term of art
"public controversy" used as part of the vortex public figure test in Gertz.”); King, supra
note at, 667 (acknowledging that the Court has “attempted to keep separate the ideas of a
public controversy for the purposes of public figures and matters of public concern more
generally”). But see King, supra note 44, at 703 (stating the two terms are “inextricably
intertwined”).
185
King, supra note 44, at 703.
186
Woy v. Turner, 573 F. Supp. 35, 38 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
187
See supra notes 168-169.
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rule in an already complex area of law with little, if any, attendant benefit.
What seems more likely is that the Court has never fully settled on one
standard, thus leaving lower courts to navigate an uncertain course in this
area.
2. Public Controversies and Matters of Public Concern Involving Lawyers
Cases involving lawyers and the legal process illustrate some of the
confusion over the public controversy/matter of public concern issue. The
Court’s holding in Time, Inc. v. Firestone that a high-profile divorce
proceeding is not a public controversy under Gertz leaves open the question
of what types of legal actions would qualify as public controversies. It
might be possible to justify the holding in Time, Inc. on the grounds that the
public has typically has only a limited and mostly prurient interest in
divorce proceedings. But as one heads down the slippery slope away from
divorce actions and toward other types of legal proceedings, it becomes
virtually impossible to draw any kind of meaningful line as to what should
qualify as a public controversy.
If part of the analysis involves consideration of whether members of the
public will be affected by the resolution of a controversy, there are
relatively few legal proceedings that satisfy this criteria. The outcome of a
legal proceeding involving the constitutionality of a health care law would
certainly qualify, as might a court’s review of an agency’s regulations
concerning food labeling. But most legal proceedings have little tangible
impact on those beyond the immediate participants. To take an extreme
example, a high-profile murder trial may involve an actual dispute that
captures public interest, but its resolution is unlikely to have ramifications
in any significant sense on anyone beyond the immediate participants and
their families. Yet, it seems inconceivable that a murder trial (or any felony
case for that matter) that attracts public attention is not a public controversy.
The fact that the judicial process is being utilized to enforce criminal law
gives the public at least some interest in judicial proceedings. Any attempt
to draw lines on the basis of whether other members of the public would
feel the impact of the resolution of a particular proceeding ignores the
reality that the public has a strong interest in knowing whether the legal
system is operating in a fair and efficient manner.
For example, in Marcone v. Penthouse International Magazine for Men,
the defamatory statement involved a lawyer’s involvement in “the largest
drug smuggling operation ever uncovered,” an operation that ended up
producing multiple indictments.188 In deciding whether the case involved a
188

754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir. 1985).
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matter of public controversy, the Third Circuit focused on whether
resolution of the drug trafficking criminal charges would affect the general
public or some segment of it.189 Based on the fact that the drug trafficking
ring was of “mammoth proportions,”190 the court had little difficulty
concluding that the matter satisfied this standard. But what if the drug
trafficking ring had operated on a more modest scale – would there still
have been a public controversy? Life would go on as before for nearly
every member of the public, regardless of the outcome of the case. But
should that mean that the matter was still not of importance to the public?
Arguably, the more relevant consideration is the strength of the public’s
interest in the enforcement of drug trafficking laws.
This is perhaps why some courts take a broader view of the “public
controversy” concept in the case of legal proceedings than Supreme Court
precedent would suggest. For example, Street v. National Broadcasting
Co.191 involved a defamatory statement concerning the main witness in an
infamous rape case from 40 years earlier. Few people outside the
immediate participants in the rape trial could be expected to feel any affect
as a result of the resolution of the controversy. Instead, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the trials qualified as a public controversy
because they “were the focus of major public debate over the ability of our
courts to render even-handed justice.”192
In cases involving legal disputes and lawyers as plaintiffs, courts tend to
take a similarly broad approach. In some cases, the legal dispute in
question could be expected to have an impact on the public at large or
segments within a society and thus easily qualify as public controversies.193
But at least as often, courts have focused more on the fact that the legal
dispute raised important civics issues of general interest to the public.
Thus, courts have routinely held that murder trials qualify as public
controversies.194 In an Idaho case, the “controversy” in which the lawyer
became involved was a seemingly non-descript estate proceeding.195 The
Michigan Court of Appeals has held that “that a trial attorney is a public
189

Id.
Id. at 1083.
191
645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981).
192
Id. at 1234.
193
See ZYZY Corp. v. Hernandez, 345 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011)
(concluding public controversy existed where the resolution of a hearing “affected not only
the individual parties to the suit, but the entire Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas, and
determined who would control vast sums of casino revenues”).
194
Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386, 400 (D.V.I. 1979); Partington v. Bugliosi, 825
F. Supp. 906, (D. Haw. 1993), aff'd, 56 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1995); Hayes v. Booth
Newspapers, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 858, 866 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
195
Bandelin v. Pietsch, 563 P.2d 395, 397-98 (Idaho 1977).
190
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figure for purposes of comment on his conduct at trial,”196 thus necessarily
implying that a trial – any trial – is a public controversy.
As is the case with defamation law more generally, some courts inquire
not whether a public controversy existed but whether the plaintiff was
involved in a matter of public concern.197 For example, in a Mississippi
case, a newspaper published an article regarding private accusations of
unethical conduct on the part of a judge and identified the plaintiff-lawyer
as having accused the judge of being a racist.198 It might have been difficult
for the court to conclude that a public controversy existed regarding the
alleged misconduct since the matter was only being discussed privately by
municipal employees.199 Instead, the court stated that the question of
whether the judge was unethical “was a matter of public concern” for the
residents of the community.200 In other cases, courts have similarly focused
on the fact that the dispute or the lawyer’s involvement in a matter captured
the public’s attention.201
B. The Increasingly Outdated Nature of the Supreme Court’s Self-Help
Rationale
Part of the Supreme Court’s justification for requiring public figures to
demonstrate actual malice is that public figures have “greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic
opportunity to counteract false statements then private individuals normally
enjoy.”202 This portion of the Court’s opinion from Gertz was written at a
different time in American history. In 1974, most Americans received their
news from one of three (maybe four) channels available on their television
sets, their local paper, or local radio stations.203 There was no such thing as
social media, and personal home computers were still years away.204 If the
average private individual was defamed in 1974, she had no realistic means
196

Fisher v. Detroit Free Press, 404 N.W.2d 765, 768 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 61 P.3d 606, 609 (Idaho 2002).
198
Griffin v. Delta Democrat Times Pub. Co., 815 So.2d 1246, 1248, 1255 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2002).
199
Id. at 1255 (Irving, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200
Id. at 1249.
201
See Schwartz v. Worrall Publications, Inc., 610 A.2d 425, 428-29 (N.J. 1992)
(focusing on the fact that the client’s “insurance problems generated widespread and
justifiable media attention”)
202
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 326 (1974).
203
See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Finding the Lost Involuntary Public Figure, 2014 UTAH
L. REV. 951, 987 (noting limited sources of news at the time).
204
See Usman, supra note 203, at 987 (discussing ensuing technological changes).
197
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to effectively state her own case and publicize the truth. 205 Thus, the
Court’s self-help rationale for public figure status was conceived at a time
when most individuals lacked the ability to effectively counteract the sting
of defamatory statements.
But as one author has observed, “Forty years of revolutionary
technological change has dramatically reduced the force of this rationale for
distinguishing public figures from private persons.”206 For example,
according to one estimate, 81% of Americans read a daily print newspaper
at the time of the Court’s decision in New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964;
today, less than 25% of Americans do.207 Instead, many individuals now
rely upon the Internet and social media as their primary sources of news and
information.208 More importantly, these tools have greatly increased the
ability of individuals to communicate their own views with others.209
According to one estimate, 73% of adults use social media in some form.210
Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms enable ordinary people
to express themselves in ways and to a range of people that would have
been inconceivable to the members of the Court deciding Gertz in 1974.211
To be sure, there are limits on the ability of a defamation victim to
effectively counter the sting of defamation through the use of technological
innovations. For one, the sheer amount of information Americans are
routinely bombarded with may make it difficult for a defamation victim to
cut through the clutter.212 For another, a blog post or Tweet from a noncelebrity is unlikely to command the type of attention that a traditional news
conference or media interview with a celebrity might. Finally, there are still
millions of Americans who do not have Internet access and who effectively
lack channels of effective communication.
But the reality is that the majority of Americans have means of rebuttal
that, while perhaps not as effective as those enjoyed by a true celebrity, may
still be effective in addressing defamation. At a minimum, most individuals
205

Douglas B. McKechnie, The Death of the Public Figure Doctrine: How the
Internet and the Westboro Baptist Church Spawned a Killer, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 469, 485
(2013).
206
Usman, supra note 203, at 976.
207
See id. at 988 (citing statistics).
208
See id. at 988 (noting that “[t]he Internet has now become the main source for news
for those under the age of fifty …”).
209
See McKechnie, supra note 205, at 486 (“[A]ny person with an Internet connection
has virtually equal access to the most effective means of mass communications the world
has ever known.”).
210
See Usman, supra note 203, at 988 (citing results of Pew Research Internet Project).
211
See id. at 487 (stating that the Internet “has an interactive capacity unattainable for
even the most effective means of communication from the Gertz era”).
212
See McKechnie, supra note 205, at 488 (stating that most of the content on the
Internet is “lost in a sea of information”).
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have means of self-help that were simply unavailable to the average citizen
in 1974. As such, technological advances have significantly undermined
one of Gertz’s primary justifications for distinguishing between public and
private figures in defamation cases.213
C. Unclear Guidance as to the Voluntary Nature of the Plaintiff’s Conduct
The Court has also provided unclear guidance regarding its voluntaryassumption-of-risk justification for requiring public figures to establish
actual malice on the part of defendants. In evaluating the nature and extent
of an individual’s participation in a controversy, the Gertz Court
emphasized the importance of the voluntariness of the plaintiff’s conduct.
Gertz spoke of voluntariness in at least two different ways. In some
passages, the Court speaks of voluntariness in terms of voluntarily thrusting
oneself into the spotlight for the purpose of influencing resolution of the
existing controversy.214 In other passages, the Court focuses more on
whether the defendant voluntarily engaged in activity that increased the
foreseeable risk of injury from a defamatory publication.215
This
inconsistency has led to lower courts sometimes taking inconsistent
approaches, in general and in cases involving lawyers.
1. Mounting the Rostrum vs. Assuming the Risk of Publicity
For some courts, the primary focus is on whether the plaintiff (a) invited
public attention to his or her views (b) in an effort to influence others on an
issue.216 To these courts, a limited-purpose public figure is one who, in the
words of Wolston, tries to “draw attention to himself in order to … arouse
public sentiment in his favor.”217 Under this view, the surest indication that
an individual has invited public attention is when the individual seeks the
limelight or “mounts the rostrum” in an effort to persuade others.218 This is
perhaps the paradigmatic public-figure scenario.219 Courts adopting this
interpretation of Gertz tend to place great weight on the plaintiff’s
interactions with the media; the more the plaintiff seeks publicity for his or
213

Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test
for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 833, 833 (2006) (stating that in light of
Gertz’s antiquated view of the media, “[t]he public figure doctrine has become an
anachronism”).
214
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 339, 344, (1974).
215
Id. at 344, 45.
216
Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 123, 136 (2d Cir. 1984).
217
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979)
218
Id. at 169 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result).
219
Marcone v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir. 1985).
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her views, the more likely it is the individual will be classified as a public
figure.220 Some courts that follow this general approach place less
emphasis on the plaintiff’s attempts to seek publicity and greater emphasis
on the fact that the plaintiff was trying to influence the outcome of a
matter.221 Such individuals have invited public comment on their actions.222
Other courts view the concept of voluntary assumption of risk in a
different manner. These courts are willing to assign public figure status
even in the absence of voluntary attempts to grab the spotlight or occupy
positions of special prominence. For these courts, the key question is
whether the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a position that made it foreseeable
that public attention would result. One who “voluntarily assumed a role of
special prominence in the public controversy”223 could realistically expect
that to have an impact on the resolution of the matter. 224 An individual may
also assume the risk of attention and defamatory comment through other
forms of voluntary conduct where they could reasonably foresee that such
conduct would result in public attention.225 Thus, as the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals has explained, “the plaintiff's action may itself invite comment
and attention, and even though he does not directly try or even want to
attract the public's attention, he is deemed to have assumed the risk of such
attention.”226 In the court’s words, such an individual must “accept the
consequences of his decision.”227

220

See, e.g., id. at 137 (focusing on plaintiff’s attempts to seek publicity for herself and
her books); Clark v. ABC, Inc., 684 F.2d 1208, 1218 (6th Cir.1982) (stating that a plaintiff
who voluntarily seeks publicity satisfies the requirement that the plaintiff’s participation in
the controversy be voluntary);
221
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
222
Id.
223
Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 539 (4th Cir. 1999)
224
Id.; see Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1084 (citing cases in which “others have been
classified as limited purpose public figures by virtue of their associations or positions”);
225
See Sisler v. Gannett Co., Inc., 516 A.2d 1083, 1095 (N.J. 1986) (holding that
actual malice standard applies “when a private person with sufficient experience,
understanding and knowledge enters into a personal transaction or conducts his personal
affairs in a manner that one in his position would reasonably expect implicates a legitimate
public interest with an attendant risk of publicity”); Great Lakes Capital Partners Ltd. v.
Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 2008 WL 5182819, *4 (Ohio App. 8 Dist., Dec. 11, 2008)
(holding that individuals who enter into certain lines of work may become public figures);
Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254, 267 (E.D.Pa.1977), aff'd,
595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.1979) (en banc) (holding that an individual who has “chosen to
engage in a profession which draws him regularly into regional and national view and leads
to ‘fame and notoriety in the community’” is a public figure).
226
Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1083.
227
McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 950 (3d Cir. 1985).
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2. Lawyers and Voluntary Conduct
One can see these competing conceptions of Gertz’s voluntariness
consideration play out in the cases involving lawyers as plaintiffs. For
some courts, the lawyer must “mount the rostrum” and attempt to shape the
views of the public at large, typically through the use of the media, in order
to qualify as a public figure.228 But for other courts, the focus is on whether
the lawyer voluntarily assumed a particularly visible position in the
forefront of a public issue. If so, the lawyer impliedly invited comment and
attention.229 For example, the fact that a lawyer agreed to represent a client
in the face of existing or likely publicity concerning a legal matter might
potentially lead to the conclusion that the lawyer “voluntarily” thrust herself
into the vortex of a public issue.230
Lawyers might also be said to voluntarily assume some risk of publicity
in another manner. By serving as the advocate for his client, a lawyer is
quite literally “purposely trying to influence the outcome” of a controversy.
To the extent the lawyer plays a major role in the matter and the matter is
truly a public one, the lawyer could perhaps be said to have voluntarily
engaged in activity that increased the foreseeable risk of injury from a
defamatory publication.
D. The Evolving Conception of Lawyer Interactions with the Media
1. Gertz and Traditional Conceptions of Lawyer Interactions with the
Media
Gertz’s specific holding that Elmer Gertz was not a limited-purpose
public figure was also based in part on the fact that Gertz never discussed
the underlying case with the press, nor was he quoted as having done so.231
This, in the majority’s view, was evidence that Gertz had not thrust himself
into the vortex of a public issue or engaged the public’s attention in an
attempt to influence the outcome of the issue.232 This portion of the Court’s
holding suggests a narrow view of the proper role of a lawyer when it
comes to communication with the public at large: the lawyer who
represents a client in a controversial matter and who does not seek to
communicate with the public concerning the matter is merely going about
the business of being a lawyer and should not be deemed a public figure. In
228

See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
230
See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
231
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
232
Id.
229
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contrast, the lawyer who communicates with the public concerning the
matter may have gone beyond the normal role of a lawyer and may be
treated as a public figure. Since Gertz, lower courts have seized on this
aspect of the decision and classified lawyers who disseminated information
to the public concerning a particular matter as public figures.233
Gertz was decided at a time when the legal profession took a dimmer
view of publicity than it does today.234 When Gertz was decided, there
were still states that prohibited lawyers from engaging in any type of
advertising.235 At the time Gertz was decided, the ABA’s Model Code of
Professional Responsibility permitted lawyers to advertise their services but
placed significant limitations on the content of those advertisements.236 The
Model Code permitted lawyers to present 25 types of fairly mundane pieces
of information, such as a lawyer’s date and place of birth, schools attended,
and bank references.237 This information could be publicized, but with the
important qualification that the information be presented “in a dignified
manner.”238 Reflecting the age in which the Model Code was written, the
advertising rules also spoke specifically only in terms of information “in
print media” or television or radio broadcast and only permitted lawyers to
advertise in the geographic area in which the lawyer or the lawyer’s clients
were located.239
2. Evolving Conceptions of Lawyer Interactions with the Media
In 1977, the Supreme Court struck down on constitutional grounds a
blanket ban on lawyer advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.240 In
defense of the restriction, the Arizona Bar offered several justifications,
233

See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
Of course, there have always been lawyers who sought the spotlight. For instance,
the Scopes evolution trial was originally conceived by the American Civil Liberties Union
as a means of generating publicity for the cause of civil liberties, Noah Feldman, Division,
Design, and the Divine: Church and State in Today’s America, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
845, 851 (2005), and famed participant Clarence Darrow was noted for seeking publicity
more generally. M.H. Hoeflich, Clarence Darrow and His Ties to Kansas, 57 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1177, 1181 (2009). Indeed, by the end of his career, Darrow had attained the level of
folk hero and when he gave his closing argument in a case involving the United Mine
Workers, hundreds of interested spectators had to be turned away. ARTHUR AND LILA
WEINBERG, CLARENCE DARROW: A SENTIMENTAL REBEL 104, 374 (1980).
235
See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (considering
constitutionality of Arizona’s blanket ban on lawyer advertisements).
236
ABA Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 2-101(B).
237
Id. DR 2-101(B)(3)(5)(15).
238
Id. DR 2-101(B).
239
Id. DR 2-101(B).
240
433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977).
234
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including the argument that lawyer advertising would have an adverse
impact on professionalism by bringing about “commercialization,” which
would “adversely affect the profession’s service orientation.”241 While
commending “the spirit of public service with which the profession of law
is practiced,” the Court opined that “the belief that lawyers are somehow
‘above’ trade has become an anachronism.”242
Nearly 40 years after Bates, law firms employ increasingly sophisticated
marketing techniques in an effort to increase name recognition, ranging
from increased social media presence to offering Groupon deals for legal
services.243 To be sure, there is still considerable disagreement regarding
the desirability of advertising for legal services. But the legal profession is
increasingly coming to the view that marketing legal services is a necessity
in today’s marketplace.244
At the same time, the profession’s attitudes toward trial publicity have
grown more liberal since Gertz. Throughout much of the 20th century, the
legal profession took a dim view of trial publicity. One of the earliest legal
ethics codes advised that, as a general matter, “newspaper publications by a
lawyer as to a pending or anticipated litigation … are to be condemned.”245
By the time of Gertz, the attitude of the profession toward publicity had
liberalized to some extent, but remained extremely conservative. The
ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility at the time prohibited
lawyers associated with a civil action from making certain kinds of
statements (such as the lawyer’s opinion as to the merits of a claim or
defense) that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication.246 Thus, the fact that the Gertz Court’s
finding that Elmer Gertz’s avoidance of the media was a significant factor
in its assessment of whether he qualified as a public figure was, to some
extent, a product of its time.
241

Id.
Id. at 368, 371-72.
243
See Elizabeth Colvin, The Dangers of Using Social Media in the Legal Profession:
An Ethical Examination in Professional Responsibility, 92 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 4
(2015) (citing results of a 2012 poll reporting that “nearly 85% of U.S. law firms use social
media for marketing purposes.”); id. at 13 (discussing conflicting state opinions on the
ability of lawyers to offer legal services through Groupon).
244
See Karl D. Shehu, “You Had Me at Hello” or “Let Them Go?”: Law Firm
Selection, Retention, and Defection in the Investment Banking Industry, 4 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 385, 422 (2011) (“Though traditionally shunned by the legal
community, law firm marketing is becoming ever more imperative as the industry rebounds
from the Great Recession.”); Mark J. Fucile, Risk Management in Law Firm Marketing,
69-JAN Or. St. B. Bull. 38, 38 (2009) (stating that “marketing has become a necessary
element of business plans for law firms big and small”).
245
Canons of Professional Ethics (1908) Canon 20.
246
ABA Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 7-107(G).
242
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But, again, Gertz was decided at a time when trials generated
significantly less public attention than they do today. To be sure, there have
always been high-profile legal matters that have captured the public’s
attention. But in today’s world, courtroom proceedings have now become
their own entertainment genre. The Gertz Court could not have predicted
that less than 20 years after its decision that an entire network – Court TV
(now TruTV) -- would spring up on cable television, devoting itself to
providing continuous live coverage of trials.247 As a result, millions of
viewers were able not just to read about but to watch, in real time,
courtroom dramas such as the O.J. Simpson and Menendez Brothers
trials.248 The public fascination with reality television that occurred soon
thereafter only increased the tendency for traditional media to focus on
court cases. And the explosion of the Internet and social media made it
possible for millions of people to have access to the courtroom in a way
they never had before.
As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has noted, with this increased public
attention on the legal system came “an increased demand for attorneys to
talk to the press.”249 The transformation in the public’s attention to legal
matters necessarily has led the legal profession to reconsider its past
hardline approach toward pretrial publicity. In 1991, the Supreme Court
rejected the view that attorney communication with the press “somehow is
inimical to the attorney's proper role” and noted that attorneys may be
valuable and reliable sources of information for the public in its
understanding of the legal process.250 ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.6, which deals with trial publicity, now takes a more permissive
approach to lawyer interactions with the media than did the older Model
Code of Professional Responsibility in effect at the time of Gertz.251 While
the legal profession remains somewhat divided on the subject of pretrial
publicity, it cannot be disputed that there has at least been a thawing with
respect to the older view.
247

David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television,
and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 786
(1997).
248
Nancy S. Marder, The Conundrum of Cameras in the Courtroom, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1489, 1551(2012); Mary Flood, Windows Opening and Doors Closing – How the Internet
is Changing Courtrooms and Media Coverage of Criminal Trials, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV.
429, 434 (2009).
249
Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 860 (1998).
250
Gentille v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1057 (1991).
251
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2014). In contrast to the older Model
Code, Model Rule 3.6(a) permits a lawyer to make an extrajudicial statement to the media
unless the lawyer knows or should know that the communication “will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. in the matter.”
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One school of thought continues to reflect the older view that lawyer
speech on pending matters is pernicious and serves no purpose other than
self-promotion.252 Professor Fred Zacharias summed up this view of lawyer
speech on pending matters when he observed that lawyers “need not say
anything to the press to represent their clients effectively.”253 On the other
side of the divide are those who argue that effective representation may
sometimes require contact with the media or, at a minimum, other efforts to
help control public perceptions concerning a matter.254 For example,
Professor Margaret Tarkington has argued that in criminal cases, the
prosecution has a natural advantage in terms of shaping pretrial publicity.
Simply by bringing charges against a defendant, a prosecutor is representing
to the public that probable cause exists to believe the defendant committed
the crime.255 Therefore, defense counsel should have greater latitude in
terms of pretrial publicity in order to offset this advantage and further the
interest in justice.256
Perhaps the most common argument in favor of permitting lawyers to
speak more freely about legal matters is that such speech is sometimes
necessary to protect a client’s interests.257 Perhaps the clearest example of
this view involved the efforts of George Zimmerman’s legal team to
influence public opinion during the investigation of and trial involving
Zimmerman’s shooting of Trayvon Martin. Zimmerman’s lawyers took the
unusual step of creating a website – George Zimmerman Legal Case258 -prior to trial. In establishing the site, Zimmerman’s lawyers explained that
social media is now “an unavoidable part of high-profile legal cases” and
that “it would be irresponsible to ignore the robust online conversation.”259
Citing the “tremendous volume of conversation on the Internet regarding
news about this case,” the defense team explained that establishing an
252

Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169,
181-82 (1997).
253
Id.
254
See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion,
Installment Two: How Far Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1119, 1128 (2010) (discussing the role of corporate counsel in shaping public opinion and
stating “behind almost every legal news-story lurks a lawyer—somewhere”).
255
Margaret Tarkington, Lost in the Compromise: Free Speech, Criminal Justice, and
Attorney Pretrial Publicity, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1873, 1892 (2014).
256
Id. at 1934.
257
See Chemerinsky, supra note 249, at 868-69 (citing the need for attorneys to speak
out in order to address leaks of information); Gerald F. Uelmen, Leaks, Gags and Shields:
Taking Responsibility, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943, 951-52 (citing the need to protect a
client’s reputation).
258
http://Gzlegalcase.com.
259
http://gzlegalcase.com/index.php/8-press-releases/7-why-social-media-for-georgezimmerman
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online presence was necessary in order to address the misinformation that
was being spread about Zimmerman and the case.260 Zimmerman’s lawyers
also used the site to post public documents related to the case “without the
filter of the media.”261
Zimmerman’s lawyers also went beyond
establishing the website. Zimmerman attorney Mark O’Meara became a
familiar figure leading up to trial as he frequently appeared on television
talk shows and held news conferences in which he discussed the case and
his client’s state of mind.262
The Zimmerman case is perhaps an extreme example in terms of cases
generating public discussion and a lawyer’s use of social media. But as the
public’s ability to follow legal cases in real time increases, the arguments in
favor of permitting lawyers to speak out publicly on behalf of their clients at
least resonate more strongly than they did when Gertz was decided. While
it is perhaps a stretch to suggest that it is common and often necessary for
lawyers to speak to the press or make use of social media in the course of
representing a client, it has certainly become more common to do so. Thus,
while Gertz’s suggestion that speaking to the media is not part of a lawyer’s
normal duties seemed perfectly reasonable at the time, the force of that
suggestion has been weakened in the ensuing four decades.
E. The Failure of the Supreme Court to Recognize the Special Role of
Lawyers
Perhaps the most noteworthy shortcoming of the Gertz decision as it
applies specifically to lawyers is the short shrift the Court gave to the fact
that was Elmer Gertz was a lawyer. The Court’s entire New York Times,
Inc. v. Sullivan line of cases is inconsistent in its treatment of how an
individual’s status or chosen profession impacts the public official/public
figure analysis. The decisions to classify the plaintiffs in Gertz and Wolston
as private figures are premised mainly on the fact that neither party
voluntarily thrust himself into the public spotlight in an attempt to shape
public discussion. Simply attaining notoriety in connection with a public
controversy was insufficient to confer public figure status. 263 In other
260
261

Id.
Id.

262

http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/12/zimmerman-attorney-concernedabout-clients-safety-he-is-stressed-tired/?iref=allsearch;
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/45755884/vp/52051226#52051226;
http://video.foxnews.com/v/1558979595001/video-mark-omara-george-zimmermansattorney-tells-reporters-his-client-is-frightened/;
http://video.foxnews.com/v/1745712226001/web-exclusive-mark-omara-on-upcomingtrial/.
263
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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decisions, the Supreme Court and lower courts have attached considerably
more weight to a plaintiff’s status alone or the nature of the plaintiff’s
profession in considering public figure status.
1. The Public Official Cases
In its decisions addressing whether an individual qualifies as a public
official, the Supreme Court has focused almost exclusively on the nature of
the plaintiff’s job. The Court’s decision in New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan
devoted little attention to the self-help and assumption of risk justifications
that later appeared in Gertz to justify requiring public officials to establish
actual malice on the plaintiff’s part. Instead, the Court rested its decision
largely on the fact that the roles that public officials occupy are of sufficient
importance to society that permitting liability to attach for merely negligent
criticisms of the performance of their duties would deter discussion of vital
public concern.264 Two years later in Rosenblatt v. Baer,265 the Court again
focused on the importance of the public employee’s position in deciding
whether he qualified as a public official: to qualify as a public official for
New York Times/actual malice purposes, the employee’s position must have
“such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the
general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all
government employees.”266 Public officials include those “those persons
who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of ... [public]
issues.”267
To a limited extent, these decisions are rooted in the assumption of risk
justification explicated in Gertz. Rosenblatt explained that to qualify as a
public official for purposes of New York Times/actual malice analysis,
“[t]he employee's position must be one which would invite public scrutiny
and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and
discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy.”268 Thus,
one who voluntarily assumes certain public positions also assumes the risk
of public scrutiny and discussion. But the opinions are also rooted in the
simple idea that the nature of a public official’s job invites and is a
legitimate topic of public discussion.

264

376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
383 U.S. 75 (1966).
266
Id. at 85.
267
Id.
268
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 n.13.
265
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2. The Public Figure Cases
There is at least a hint of this same approach in the Court’s public figure
cases. Gertz indicates that a limited-purpose public figure is almost always
one who actively seeks to engage the public’s attention.269 But this is not
necessarily true for the all-purpose or general-purpose public figure. The
all-purpose public figure may not have been trying to engage the public’s
attention, let alone trying to influence resolution of any kind of public
controversy. As Gertz explains, it is enough that one, through “notoriety of
their achievements,”270 has attained “pervasive fame or notoriety.”271
Lower courts have followed this approach. In short, status alone is
sufficient to render one an all-purpose public figure.
This same theme appears in the Court’s first decision extending the
actual malice standard to public figures as well as public officials. Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts272 involved two separate plaintiffs: Edwin A.
Walker, a private individual, who had been outspoken and had received
public attention on the issue of federal intervention in civil rights matters,
and Wallace Butts, the athletic director at the University of Georgia, who
was accused of having helping to fix a college football game.273
Foreshadowing the concept of a limited-purpose public figure, the Court
observed that Walker qualified as a public figure “by his purposeful activity
amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the ‘vortex’ of an important
public controversy.”274 Butts, in contrast, attained public figure status “by
position alone.”275 In this respect, Butts’ treatment of this type of public
figure is quite similar to New York Times’ treatment of public officials.
While the Court’s subsequent decisions in Gertz and Wolston shied
away from the idea that one can become a limited-purpose public figure by
notoriety alone,276 lower courts have often been willing to classify an
individual as a limited-purpose public figure based on notoriety attained by
engaging in an occupation or profession that invites public attention and
comment.277 The clearest example of this is in cases involving athletes. For
269

See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 32, 3423 (1974).
271
Id. at 351.
272
388 U.S. 130 (1967)
273
Id. at 135, 140.
274
Id. at 155.
275
See id. (stating that Butts “may have attained [public figure] status by position
alone”).
276
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
277
See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1299 n. 36 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (“Sometimes position alone can make one a public figure.”); see also Milsap v.
Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 100 F.3d 1265, 1269 (7 th Cir. 1996) (concluding that individual who
270
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example, Barry v. Time, Inc., a 1984 decision from a federal court in
California, articulated the view that by accepting certain jobs, an individual
invites attention and comment.278 And if attention and comment follows,
the individual may be treated as a public figure.279 In that case, the plaintiff
was a college basketball coach who accepted the job at a time when there
was an ongoing controversy as to alleged recruiting violations at the
college.280 In the court’s view, the decision to accept the job under these
circumstances amounted to sufficient “thrusting” under Gertz to justify
public figure status.281 But the court went further and noted that there was a
“long line” of cases, dating back to Butts, finding professional and college
athletes and coaches to be public figures.282 From these cases, the court
observed a common thread: “one's voluntary decision to pursue a career in
sports, whether as an athlete or a coach, ‘invites attention and comment’
regarding his job performance and thus constitutes an assumption of the risk
of negative publicity.”283
Indeed, the Barry court is correct in its observation. For example, in a
post-Gertz decision, a Pennsylvania federal court made the following
observation in a case involving a professional athlete:
Where a person has, however, chosen to engage in a profession which
draws him regularly into regional and national view and leads to “fame
and notoriety in the community,” even if he has no ideological thesis to
promulgate, he invites general public discussion .... If society chooses to
had been appointed as director of a prominent anti-poverty program “put himself in the
public eye” and attained the notoriety necessary to render him a public figure); Price v.
Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding that FBI agent who
“occupied a prominent role in public affairs within” an Indian reservation and who “played
a substantial role in the investigation of crimes on the Reservation” was a public figure,
despite any indication that he sought publicity); Great Lakes Capital Partners Ltd. v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 2008 WL 5182819, *4 (Ohio App. 8 Dist., Dec. 11, 2008) (holding
that individuals who enter into certain lines of work may become public figures); White v.
Mobile Press Register, Inc., 514 So. 2d 902, 904 (Ala. 1987) (holding that individual’s
“choice of career as a high level executive in an industry that is the subject of much public
interest and concern” rendered him a public figure).
278
Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (explaining that one
who decides to pursue a career in sports assumes the risk of attention and comment with
respect to his performance).
279
Id.
280
Id. at 1118.
281
Id.
282
Id. at 1119 (citing Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1254–55
(5th Cir.1980),; Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254, 267
(E.D.Pa.1977), aff'd , 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir.1979); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d
378, 380 (4th Cir.1971); Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 441 F.2d 378, 379 (5th Cir.1971);
Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir.1968).
283
Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1119.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2724880

44

Lawyer as Public Figure

[29-Jan-16

direct massive public attention to a particular sphere of activity, those
who enter that sphere inviting such attention must overcome the Times
standard.284
The Third Circuit later affirmed, concluding that “[p]rofessional athletes, at
least as to their playing careers, generally assume a position of public
prominence” and that the plaintiff, a professional football player, was a
public figure.285
The D.C. Circuit has advanced a similar theme. In Waldbaum v.
Fairchild Publications, Inc., the court observed that “[s]ometimes position
alone can make one a public figure.”286 But there may also be situations in
which the responsibilities of an individual’s position are sufficiently
important that the individual becomes a public figure. For example, “the
responsibilities of a position may include decisionmaking that affects
significantly one or more public controversies, in which case the occupant
becomes a limited public figure for those controversies.”287
The idea that one may become a public figure just on the basis of one’s
status rather than any attempt to court fame has also been applied to
lawyers. In one federal district court case from Maryland, a lawyer had
held “high-profile positions, including serving as counsel to the World Bank
and to the Government of Nigeria in several high profile cases” and had
competed “at the highest echelon of the legal profession worldwide.”
Based on these facts, the court concluded that the lawyer was a public
figure despite the lack of any evidence that he had thrust himself into the
spotlight for the purpose of influencing resolution of any existing
controversy.288
3. The Public Nature of the Legal Profession
Ample authority existed at the time of Gertz for the Supreme Court to
have factored into its analysis the fact that Elmer Gertz was a lawyer, a
position that at least in some instances invites public attention and
comment. Moreover, the fact that Gertz was a lawyer who had voluntarily
accepted employment in connection with an ongoing public controversy
might also have been a relevant consideration for the Court. Finally, the
fact that Gertz had decisionmaking responsibility for the representation of
284

Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254 (E.D.Pa.1977), aff'd,
595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.1979) (en banc).
285
Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1979).
286
627 F.2d 1287, 1299 n. 36 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
287
Id.
288
Ugwuonye v. Rotimi, Civil No. PJM 09–658, 2012 WL 5928647, *2 (Nov. 26,
2012).
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the family in its wrongful death suit and thus could potentially influence the
resolution of the matter would also seem to have been a relevant
consideration in deciding whether Gertz had assumed the risk of resulting
publicity. For whatever reason, however, the Court did not overtly take
these realities into account.
This failure represents an odd omission from the Court’s opinion. The
legal profession has long viewed its members as occupying a special role
within society. At the time Gertz was decided, the Preamble to the ABA’s
Model Code of Professional Responsibility boldly proclaimed, “Lawyers, as
guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society.”289 The
Preamble to the ABA’s current Model Rules of Professional Conduct
observes that “[a] lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice.”290 The job of a lawyer is often a public one. By choosing to
become a lawyer, a person has chosen to engage in a profession which may
sometimes draw him into the public arena and which, by definition, often
involves disputes in which the public has a strong interest. This is more
likely to be true in the case of litigators, whose job requires them to enter
public courtrooms in order to help influence the resolution of disputes, than
transactional lawyers. But even transactional lawyers are “public citizens”
who use the machinery of the law to advance their client’s interests.
As public citizens with special obligations with respect to the quality of
justice, lawyers may have special obligations more generally with respect to
the legal system. As explained by the Michigan Supreme Court, “the law
has reposed special stewardship duties on lawyers on the basis of the
venerable notion that lawyers are more than merely advocates who happen
to carry out their duties in a courtroom environment, they are also officers
of the court.”291 Given the public’s strong interest in the efficient operation
of the justice system, the public has a greater interest in being informed of
and regulating the behavior of members of the legal profession than it does
with other professions. For instance, courts are generally more willing in
the case of lawyers than other occupations to invalidate contracts that
violate rules of professional conduct on the grounds that such contracts
offend public policy.292 And in upholding special restrictions on the ability
289

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1980).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PMBL. ¶ 1 (2014).
291
Grievance Adm'r v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 133 (Mich. 2006).
292
See Benjamin P. Cooper, Taking Rules Seriously: The Rise of Lawyer Rules as
Substantive Law and the Public Policy Exception in Contract Law, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
267, 271 (2013) (stating that court have increasingly relied upon lawyers’ rules of
professional conduct “as a source of substantive law in deciding the enforceability of the
prohibited agreements”); Alex B. Long, Attorney-Client Fee Agreements That Offend
Public Policy, 61 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 287, 301 (2009) (noting most courts
290
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of lawyers to criticize judges, some courts have expressed the view that
such restrictions are justified because lawyers occupy a special role as
officers of the court and their views regarding the legal system are afforded
greater credibility by the public.293 In short, the law sometimes treats
lawyers differently because of the public function lawyers serve.
Therefore, it is somewhat surprising, given the Court’s earlier emphasis
on status and position in New York Times and Butts, that Gertz’s status as a
lawyer played no obvious role in the Court’s decisionmaking process in
Gertz on the question of public figure status.

IV. LAWYERS AS PUBLIC FIGURES
Cases involving lawyers as defamation plaintiffs illustrate the numerous
shortcomings of the Supreme Court’s New York Times v. Sullivan line of
cases. The lack of clarity and shifting focus in the decision has resulted in
confusion and misclassification in some instances. In a perfect world, the
Court would start from scratch and adopt a uniform standard that does not
rely on arguably unworkable distinctions between public and private
figures.294 Assuming this is unlikely to happen, lower courts could still
provide some much needed clarification and revision to the law in the area
in a manner that is consistent with the spirit of Supreme Court decisions in
this area. Cases involving lawyers as defamation plaintiffs provide a useful
tool for doing so. In the process, lower courts could also provide some
much needed guidance for future litigants in defamation cases involving
lawyers as plaintiffs.
A. Loosening the Restrictions of the Gertz Categories
Currently, many courts view Gertz as establishing only two categories
of public figures: all-purpose public figures who have attained extensive
fame and notoriety and limited-purpose public figures who have thrust
themselves into the vortex of a pre-existing public controversy in order to
influence resolution of that controversy. Some are at least willing to
recognize the possibility that the “rare” individual might qualify as a public
“have generally refused, on policy grounds, to enforce fee agreements that run afoul of the
ethical rules governing attorneys”).
293
Florida Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 559 (Fla. 2001) (“"Because members of the Bar
are viewed by the public as having unique insights into the judicial system, the state's
compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the judiciary supports applying a
different standard than that applicable in defamation cases.").
294
See King, supra note 44, at 698 (suggesting that all defamation plaintiffs should be
required to establish actual malice).
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figure through no purposeful action of her own. But the result is that courts
sometimes fail to classify individuals as public figures who logically should
qualify.
All too often, lower courts have engaged in an excessively formalistic
reading of Gertz and its progeny that has detracted from the central message
of New York Times v. Sullivan that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited.295 This has resulted in such pointless semantic discussions as
whether a matter of ongoing public debate is a “public controversy” or
merely a public issue or matter of public concern. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the decision of many courts to establish two (or at best
three) rigid categories of public figures. The Gertz Court was clear,
however, that it was not announcing a rigid set of public figure categories
but was instead “lay[ing] down broad rules of general application.”296 As
one author has noted, “the Gertz prototypes do not freeze the law; they are
useful prototypes, stimulants to thought ….”297 In fact, New York Times,
Butts, and Gertz provide sufficient authority for the recognition of at least
one other type of public figure: those whose occupations or professions
necessarily create a foreseeable likelihood of resulting notoriety. 298 This
category would often include athletes, entertainers, and – notably –
lawyers.299
New York Times and Butts both provide support for the position that
some individuals occupy positions that may foreseeably lead to notoriety
and public comment.300 Gertz justifies imposing the burden on public
figures to establish actual malice largely on assumption of risk grounds.
While Gertz’s “access to the channels of effective communication”
rationale has been substantially weakened over time, the assumption of risk
rationale – the “more important” of the two rationales – still retains some
force. Logically, then, it stands to reason that some individuals can be said
to have assumed the risk of notoriety and public comment by virtue of the
occupation or profession they have chosen to enter and should therefore be
295

To be clear, this is due in no small part to the Supreme Court’s own statements in
Gertz and subsequent decisions.
296
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
297
BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 7.4, at 7-86 (2d ed.).
298
See id. § 7.4, at 7-87 (arguing for such a standard); Chapman v. Journal Concepts,
Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1093 (D. Hawaii 2007) (stating that an individual may be a
public figure by assuming risk of publicity resulting from his position); Susan M. Gilles,
From Baseball Parks to the Public Arena: Assumption of the Risk in Tort Law and
Constitutional Libel Law, 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 231, 244-45 (2002) (discussing the Court’s
use of assumption of risk principles in its defamation cases).
299
See Sanford, supra note 297, at § 7.4, at 7-87 (stating that celebrities and athletes
would fit this category).
300
See supra notes 272-288 and accompanying text.
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required to establish actual malice.
If a court were inclined to define this category of individuals narrowly,
it could be defined so that it largely tracks the public official category. At a
minimum, an individual may be a public figure where the individual’s
chosen field places the individual in a position to significantly influence the
resolution of public issues.301 The category would also include those whose
chosen fields place them in a position of such apparent importance that the
public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of
the people who hold them.302
Admittedly, this standard has its own ambiguity issues.303 However,
there are meaningful markers to guide a court’s analysis. Where a court’s
focus is on the existence of a matter of public concern (as opposed to a
public controversy), the question is often about whether the public has a
special interest in the plaintiff’s activities that are the subject of the
defamatory statement. For example, restaurants and other places of public
accommodations are often classified as public figures for purposes of
statements concerning the services they provide because restaurants actively
seek public patrons and offer services to the public at large.304 In support of
this conclusion, courts have cited the strong interest the public has in
consumer reporting on the services provided by entities that provide goods
and services to the public.305 As explained by one court, “by its nature,
consumer reporting involves matters of particular interest to the public.”306
Some courts have also cited the fact that a business is subject to
extensive government regulation in support of the conclusion that the public
has a particular interest in the affairs of the business and that the business is,
therefore, a public figure for defamation purposes.307 Under this approach,
301

Cf. supra note 283 and accompanying text.
Cf. supra note 266 and accompanying text.
303
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Talking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049,
1097-98 (2000) (stating “that the theoretical criticisms of the public concern / private
concern distinction are sound” and citing examples of courts classifying as speech on
matters of private concern matters “speech that clearly seems to be of public concern under
any normal definition of the term”).
304
Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 57 P.3d 82, 92 (Nev.2002); Journal–Gazette Co.
v. Bandido's, 712 N.E.2d 446, 454 (Ind.1999); Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc. v. Newsday,
Inc., 334 N.Y.S.2d 325, 331 (Sup. Ct. 1972); SMOLLA, supra note 14, at §2:98.50; see
also Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 272 (3d Cir.1980) (concluding
restaurant was a public figure based, in part, on its extensive advertising).
305
Quantum Electronics Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 753
(D.R.I. 1995); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 280 (3rd Cir.1980); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 580 F. Supp. 1249, 1270-71 (D. Mass. 1981).
306
Quantum Electronics Corp., 881 F. Supp. at 764.
307
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y.1977); Coronado
302
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the fact that an entity, such as insurance company, is subject to close
regulation by the state is evidence that that the entity invites public attention
and comment.308 Along those same lines, numerous state statutes declare it
to be a matter of public concern that only qualified individuals be permitted
to engage in various professions and practices. These professions and
practices include optometry, dentistry, pharmacy, architecture, and
cosmetology.309 These statutes also frequently explain that it is a matter of
public concern that these practices and professions enjoy the confidence of
the public.310 Of course, unlike the legal profession, these are all
professions and practices that are heavily regulated by state legislatures.
But, as the next section discusses in more detail, the analogies to the legal
profession are still hard to avoid.
Alternatively, a court could choose to define the category in a slightly
more manner to include those whose chosen occupations or professions
make it foreseeable that publicity and public comment may result, such as
the Athletic Director at the University of Georgia in Butts.312 To the extent
there needs to be a limiting principle, individuals could be classified as
public figures only for purposes of defamatory statements having some
clear connection or relevance to their occupations or position, a la the
athletic director being accused of fixing a game. Regardless of the precise
formulation, the result would be a more meaningful way of resolving the
public figure question.
B. Lawyers as Public Figures
Lawyers provide a clear example of the benefits of and justifications for
such an approach. Some lawyers should be classified as limited-purpose
Credit Union v. KOAT Television, Inc., 656 P.2d 896, 904 (N.M. 1982) American Benefit
Life Insurance Company v. McIntyre, 375 So. 2d 239 (Ala.1979); Steak Bit of Westbury,
Inc. v. Newsday, Inc., 334 N.Y.S.2d 325, 331 (Sup. Ct. 1972); SMOLLA, supra note 14, at §
2:98 (2013); see also 3 ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS, §
5.3.7, at 5-7 (concluding that “when a corporation ‘goes public’ by publicly offering its
securities, it has taken a specific, voluntary action, the known result of which will be
mandatory increased public scrutiny” and should be treated as a public figure). But see
Blue Ridge Bank v. Veribanc, Inc., 866 F.2d 681, 688 (4 th Cir. 1989) (“We cannot accept
the proposition, tacitly adopted in some jurisdictions, that a business enterprise loses much
of the protection afforded by the traditional law of defamation simply as a result of being
subject to pervasive governmental regulation.”).
308
American Benefit Life Ins. Co., 375 So. 2d at 242.
309
Ala. Code § 34-22-2 (optometry); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90–22(a) (2013) (dentistry);
Ala. § 34-23-2 (pharmacy); id. § 34-2-31 (architecture); La. Rev. Stat. § 37:562
(cosmetology).
310
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 34-2-31.
312
See supra notes 272-275 and accompanying text (discussing Butts).
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public figures with little difficulty even under Gertz’s restrictive category.
The most obvious examples are cause lawyers. For some lawyers, engaging
in a legal dispute is a means of political expression.313 For these lawyers,
litigation is undertaken for the purpose of advancing their particular
causes.314 Therefore, cause lawyers – lawyers for whom the legal process is
a means of advancing a particular cause – mount the rostrum in a public
manner and should ordinarily be classified as public figures to the extent
they play a significant role in a public controversy.
But even the average lawyer who becomes the subject of significant
public attention through the performance of her duties or in her professional
capacity should ordinarily be treated as a public figure. The legal
profession routinely posits that lawyers are public citizens having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.”315 Indeed, the notion of the
“citizen-lawyer” or “lawyer-statesman” has deep roots in American history.
As Dean Davison Douglas has detailed, when Thomas Jefferson
conceived of the first legal education curriculum in the United States, his
goal was “to educate a group of ‘public citizens’—those who would place
public interest ahead of private interest and exercise leadership in
preserving republicanism.”316 Jefferson believed it was necessary to instill
in aspiring lawyers “public virtue”—“[t]he sacrifice of individual interests
to the greater good of the whole.”317 Jefferson’s vision was widely adopted
at the time, as evidenced, in part, the large number of lawyers who served as
elected officials during the first half of the nineteenth century.318
It would obviously be a gross oversimplification to argue that the U.S.
legal profession has always and forever consisted of an army of public
citizens seeking to serve broader societal needs. However, the idea of the
lawyer as occupying a public role looms large in the history of the legal
profession. For much of the 20th century, the dominant conception of the
lawyer was as one who was “simultaneously a zealous representative of
clients and a guardian of the public good.”319 As described by Professor
Russell G. Pearce, this “Professionalism Paradigm” was based “on a
purported bargain between the profession and society in which the
313

In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 428 (1978).
Id. at 431.
315
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PMBL. ¶ 1 (2014).
316
Davison M. Douglas. The Jeffersonian Vision of Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 185, 193-94 (2001).
317
Id. (quoting Gordon Wood, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787, at 53 (1969)).
318
Id. at 211.
319
Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture:
Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 1, 26 (2011).
314
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profession agreed to act for the good of clients and society in exchange for
autonomy.”320 Under this conception of what it means to be a lawyer,
“lawyers altruistically place the good of their clients and the good of society
above their own self-interest.”321
This conception of lawyers as “guardians of the public good”322 might
manifest itself in a number of ways. Lawyers might fulfill their obligations
as public citizens by assuming leadership roles within the community and at
large.323 For example, Professor Deborah Rhode and others have written
extensively about the concept of lawyers as leaders and the various ways in
which lawyers serve as leaders in society.324 Lawyers might also take on a
public role by engaging in public service. According to Woodrow Wilson,
“public life was a lawyer’s forum” and the practice of law imposed upon a
lawyer an obligation to “shape matters of public concern.”325 Thus,
according to Professors Pearce and Eli Wald, “It was not uncommon for
elite lawyers in the first half of the twentieth century to shuttle between
high-level government positions in Washington, D.C. and private law
practice in Wall Street's large firms.”326
Lawyers may also fulfill their end of the bargain as part of the
professionalism paradigm by helping to ensure that members of the public
are not denied access to justice. In exchange for the freedom from external
regulation and its monopoly on the practice of law, lawyers may satisfy
their obligations to the public by being willing to help ensure access to
justice.327 This obviously could entail providing pro bono services, but it
320

Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1229, 1231 (1995).
321
Id.
322
Pearce & Wald, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 26.
323
See Dean Stacy Leeds, Increasing Diversity in Arkansas’s Law Schools and Our
Profession, ARK. LAWYER, 17 (Winter 2004) (referencing “community leaders who have
been the perfect models of ‘lawyer as community leader’”).
324
See Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Leaders, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 413, 413
(discussing the many leadership roles that lawyers play); David C. Hardesty, Leading
Lawyers – Lawyers in Leadership Roles -- Implications for the Profession, 2009-DEC W.
Va. Law. 37 (October/Dec. 2009) (noting the historical leadership role that lawyers have
played); Al Harvey, Lawyers are the Leaders in Making it Work, 39-JUN Tenn. B.J. 3
(June 2003) (discussing the role of lawyers as leaders in society).
325
Woodrow Wilson, The Lawyer in the Community, in 21 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW
WILSON 64, 67, 70 (1976) (quoted in Rhode, supra note 7, at 1325); see also Robert W.
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (quoting Wilson’s
views on the role of lawyers in shaping politics and public policy).
326
Pearce & Wald, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 27.
327
See Soha F. Turfler, Note, A Model Definition of the Practice of Law: If Not Now,
When? An Alternative Approach to Defining the Practice of Law, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1903, 1925-27 (2004) (discussing the professional paradigm in connection with access to
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might also involve being willing to represent unpopular clients.328 The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct advise that a lawyer has an ethical
obligation to accept “a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or
unpopular clients.”329 Summing up the idea of a lawyer as public citizen,
John Adams famously observed that his representation of the British
soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre was “one of the best Pieces of
Service I ever rendered my Country.”330
But even those lawyers who view the practice of law more as a business
than a calling or who do not accept the professionalism paradigm must
concede that the public has a strong interest in the qualifications and
integrity of lawyers. The public unquestionably also has a particular
interest in being informed of judicial proceedings and also has a legitimate
interest in being informed about how the state-sanctioned legal process
operates.331 This is a theme that runs throughout the unauthorized practice
of law and professional discipline cases involving lawyers.332 And the
public has an equally strong interest in the effective administration of
justice.333 As public citizens with special obligations with respect to the
quality of justice, lawyers obviously play a vital role in that process.
Classifying lawyers as public figures where the performance of their duties
results in public attention and comment would be consistent with the legal
justice).
328
See Margaret Tarkington, Freedom of Attorney-Client Association, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 1071, 1116 (arguing that the representation of the accused and unpopular is a way for
lawyers to promote the legitimacy of the justice system).
329
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.2 cmt. [1] (2014).
330
JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 79 (L.H. Butterfield
ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1961) (1815).
331
See generally Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (“With
respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee
the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the
administration of justice.” ).
332
See Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc., 818 N.E.2d 1181, 1189 (Ohio
2004) (explaining that the “purpose of that regulation is to “protect the public against
incompetence, divided loyalties, and other attendant evils that are often associated with
unskilled representation.”); In re Jans, 666 P.2d 830, 833 (Or. 1983) (stating that the
appearance of impropriety, while not a basis for professional discipline, “adversely affects
public confidence in the legal profession”); Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and
Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 5-6 (1998) (identifying two of the basic goals of the lawyer disciplinary system as
the protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the legal profession).
333
Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Artimez, 540 S.E.2d 156, 164-65 (W. Va. 2000)
(explaining that the purpose of the lawyer professional discipline system is to protect the
public’s interest in the administration of justice); Levin, supra note 332, 5-6 (identifying
one of the basic goals of the lawyer disciplinary system as protection of the administration
of justice).
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profession’s view of itself and its proffered justifications for self-regulation.
In short, if lawyers insist on calling themselves public citizens and claiming
the benefits of that title, they should also be willing to accept the burdens
that go along with that title.
The assumption of risk justification offered in Gertz for requiring public
figures to prove actual malice applies with considerable force in the case of
lawyers. Given the realities of modern society and law practice, lawyers can
reasonably foresee that their professional endeavors may result in
significant public attention and comment. Sometimes, the attention and
comment might result from a lawyer’s successes or failures. Other times, it
might result from a lawyer’s involvement in a high-profile matter. Modern
lawyers can also be expected to foresee that their representation of a client
may require them to interact with the public in a manner inconceivable to
lawyers 50 years ago. Gone also are the days when the average lawyer
could develop a client base simply by doing a good job. Marketing is now
seen as a necessity for many law firms, and, through their advertisements
and social media marketing, more and more lawyers have willingly sought
to engage the public’s attention.
Even lawyers who are appointed in a matter could be argued to have
assumed the risk of resulting publicity stemming from the matter. Courts
have long claimed the inherent authority to appoint lawyers in court
matters.334 Rule 6.2 of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibit a lawyer from seeking to avoid a court appointment without good
cause. Therefore, the nature of an attorney’s role creates at least some
potential for an attorney to make her way into court and into the public eye.
Moreover, the state has an especially strong interest in establishing
defamation rules that do not deter discussion of the legal system and those
who play crucial roles within that system. The public has an undeniably
strong interest in information pertaining to the legal system.335 This also
clearly includes an interest in discussing the qualifications and performance
of those charged with special responsibility for the quality of justice.336
334

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2007); In re Elrich S., 5 A.3d 27, 40

(2010).
335

See Encyclopedia Brown Prods., Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 26 F.Supp.2d 606,
612 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“There is a particularly strong presumption of public access to
[judicial] decisions as well as to the briefs and documents submitted in relation thereto.”);
see also Renee Newman Knake, Legal Information, the Consumer Law Market, and the
First Amendment, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2843, 2845 (2014) (arguing “that the creation and
dissemination of legal information by lawyers warrant heightened protection in certain
instances”).
336
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character
and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages.”); Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be
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These are matters of considerable importance to the public, as evidenced by
the elaborative set of professional conduct rules and enforcement
procedures designed to protect the public from incompetent and unethical
lawyers.
The state has a particularly strong interest in the free flow of
information relating to a lawyer’s qualifications or performance in an age in
which such information is routinely disseminated. Law offices are places of
public accommodation that offer legal services to the public.337 Lawyers
also now routinely market their services to the public, and there are any
number of online lawyer rating services through which clients can provide
and learn information about a lawyer’s services. Extending the protection
afforded by the actual malice test to consumer information concerning
lawyers furthers the state’s strong interest in the dissemination of
information relating to services provided by places of public
accommodation. Given the public’s strong interest in making informed
decisions with respect to choice of counsel, there is no compelling
justification for allowing the determination of what legal standard should
apply to hinge on the inconsequential consideration of whether there was an
ongoing “public controversy” when the defamatory statement was made.
There remains the concern raised by some courts that increasing the
number of instances in which lawyers are subject to the actual malice
standard might dissuade lawyers from agreeing to represent clients in
difficult, unpopular, high profile, or sensational types of cases.338 The
realities of modern communication methods and modern law practice
undermine the strength of this concern. The Internet, social media, and
other forms of media now make it possible for even seemingly trivial
matters to “go viral” and produce unwanted public attention. As a logical
matter, the risk of unwanted attention and publicity would seem to be a
greater deterrent to a lawyer taking on an unpopular client than the
hypothetical and, frankly, remote possibility that the representation will
produce a defamation claim that would be worth pursuing. In addition, the
arguments underlying the Professional Paradigm and the assumption of risk
arguments advanced in this Article also undermine the concerns over
extending the actual malice standard. Lawyers who enter the profession
today do so knowing that providing access to justice is a part of their
professional responsibilities and that the public has a strong interest in the
fair administration of justice. Having to establish that a defendant knew a
Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J.
1567, 1585-87 (2009) (describing speech concerning judges as core First Amendment
speech).
337
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statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of a
statement seems a small burden to endure in exchange for the benefits and
freedom from external regulation that lawyers enjoy.
Ultimately, classifying lawyers as public figures for purposes of
defamatory statements having some clear connection or relevance to their
profession would be consistent with the goal of encouraging public
discussion of the legal process and the legal profession’s own public
statements about the profession.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s line of defamation cases beginning with New York
Times v. Sullivan have left lower courts with a confusing and sometimes
contradictory set of standards to follow. At the same time, courts have long
struggled with the question of whether ordinary legal principles should
apply to lawyers or whether special lawyer-specific standards should
apply.339 These two realities have collided in defamation cases involving
lawyers as plaintiffs, and the results have been about what one might
expect. But by reviving the Supreme Court’s early pronouncements on the
subject of defamation law and giving full recognition to the legal
profession’s professed views of itself and the realities of modern practice,
courts can develop more consistent and logical principles, both in general
and in the special case of lawyers as plaintiffs.
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